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I. A REVIEW OF THE NEW TAX BURDENS CAUSE D 
BY LEGALIZING GAMBLING ACTIVITIES 
A. An Analysis of the Arguments Used by Gambling 
Proponents to Convince Public Officials 
In the ir attempts to win public acceptance, "legaliza-
tion" by state legislatures, and approval by local govern-
ments, gambling interests typically promise that once 
gambling activities are legalized, new tax revenues will be 
generated for various government units eager for new 
sources of funds. 1 When these promises are combined with 
t This article analyzes only licensed gambling activities which occur outside 
of the Native American reservations. It is significant that the legal gambling 
activi[ies on the reservations basically pay no taxes whatsoever. Therefore. the 
taxing problems, public policy concerns, and windfall profitS issues associated with 
off-reservation legalized gambling can often become greater problems when applied 
in the context of the reservations, particularly when off-reservation companies are 
managing the gambling activitieli. For examples of on-reservation accounting and 
management issues, sec OFF. INSPECTOR GENERAL, U.S. DEP'T INTERIOR, AUDIT 
REPORT. ISSUES IMPAcnNG IMPLEMENTATION OF THE INDIAN GAMING 
REGULATORY Acr (Nov. 1993) [hereinafter AUDIT REPORT]. The rapid 
development of legal gambling operations on the reservations has created numerous 
problems which need further analysis: 
[The U.S. Department of the Interior's] review identified 37 gaming 
operations that did not have approved compacts (versus 80 approved 
compacts) and that therefore were operating in apparent violation of the 
Act. Also 18 management contracts requ ired payment of what appeared to 
be excessive fees totaling $622 million over the life of the contracts. In 
addition, 13 leasing contracts existed for video gaming equipment that 
could have been purchased for $3.2 million but which instead was leased 
for $40.3 million. We also found that from 1988 through 1992, the U.S. 
Attorney in the Eastern District of Wisconsin identified several instances 
where tribes invol\'ed in gaming operations losl approximately SSOO,OOO 
through theft and embezzlement. 
AUDIT REPORT, supra. at 4. 
tt Professor, Univ. Ill.; A.B. 1972, Will iam & Mary: J.D. 1976, MBA 1977, 
Univ. Ga.; LL..M. 1978. SJD 1981. Univ. Va. 
I. For a specific industry proposal which invo!\'es land-based casino-style gam· 
bling in Chicago, sec CHtCAGO GAMING CoMM'N. ECONO~IIC A'ID OrHER IMPACTS 
OF A PROPOSED GAMJNO, ENTERTAINMENT AND HOTEL FACILITY (May 19, 1992) 
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projections for new jobs and economic development for lo-
cal communities, government officials often become con-
vinced that legal ized gambling operations will be a panacea 
for economic hard tirnes.2 Usually added to these argu-
ments are claims that local residents do not pay for gam-
bling, but that the majori ty of revenues actually comes from 
out-of-state tourists.3 However, opponents counter that 
uti li zing legalized gambling activities to raise revenues via-
(report prepared by Oeloiue & Touche, Chicago, III.) fhereinafter PROPOSED 
G""'OUNG FACILITY REPORT)' The new ta", revenue projections were substantial. 
Id. al 270-71. However, several problems involving these calculations meant thaI 
there were substantial public misperceptions about the new tax revenues to be gen-
erated by the projected casino complex in Chicago. John W. Kindt. The Economic 
Impacts Of Legalized Gambling A crivities, 43 DRAKE L. RIN. 51, 55-56 nn.28·43 
(1994) [hereinafter Economic Impact.!" ). These problems were also identified in anal-
yses by several Illinois government units. For a summary of these problems, see 
Governor Warns Land-Based Casinos Could Bring Crime Surge As Well As Overall 
Loss Of Jobs And State Revenues, Press Release from Office of Illinois Governor 
James Edgar (Sept. 29. 1992) [hereinafter III . Gov. Press Release I992J. See also 
Earl Grinols. Al RevDlue Producer, Gambling 1$ Bad Debl, CHI. SUN-TIMES. Dec. 7. 
1991. at 18 1hereinaflc r Gambling Re'l'Dlue Bad]. See generally Mark E. Stover. Rev· 
enue POIen/iaf of Stafe Lotteries, 15 PUB. FIN. Q. 428 (1987). For an analysis of taxa-
tion in the context of casino gambli ng. see Mary O. Borg et al.. The InCidence of 
Taxes 011 Casino Gambling. SO AM. J. ECON. & Soc. 323 (1991). 
2. ROBERT GOODMAN. Cnt. ECON. DEVELOPMENT U. MASS. AMHERST, LE-
GALIZt:D GAMllLJNG AS /I. STR/l.TEOY FOR ECONOMIC DEVFLOPMFNT 16-18 (1994) 
[hereinafter CED REPORT]: Nearillg all the Natiorwl Impact Of Casmo Gambling 
Proliferation. Hou.fC Comm. on S"wll 8usin~, l03d Cong., 2d Sess. (1994)(testi-
mony of Prof. Robert Goodman, U. Mass.) [hereinafter Cong. HcarmsJ; Paul Olas-
tris & Andrew Bates, The Fool's Gold In Gambfjng, Stales Learn How Hard Ills To 
Control Gamillg, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP .. Apr. I. 1991. at 22 [hereinafter Fool's 
Gold). 
3. Florida, the state with the largest tourism industry in the United States. 
challenged and largely dispelled many of the arguments thai legalized gambling ac-
tivi ties promoted tourism. During 1994, the Florida Department of Commerce, the 
Florida Division of Tourism, and the Florida Governor'S Office conducted studies 
which concluded that casino-st}'le gambling would actually hUrt pre-existing tourism. 
FlA. DEP'T CoM., IMPLIC/l.TIONS 01' CASJNO GAMBLINO As AN ECONOMIC DEVEL. 
OPMENT STRATEGY 5, 6 (Bur. Econ. Analysis 1994); FlA. OffiCE or TIiE GOVER. 
NOR, CASlt-.OS IN FLORlOA: AN AN/l.LYSIS OF THE ecONOMIC AND SoctAL 
IMPACfS executive summary (1994) Ihereinafter FLA. Gov. AN/l.LYSISj; Press Re-
lease from the Florida Dep't Com .• Commerce Analysis: Casinos Bad Bet for Flor-
ida. Sept. 19, 1994. at 1 [hereinafter Fla. Dep't Com. Press ReleaseJ. According to 
the report by the Florida Departmelll of Commerce and the Flo rida Division of 
Tourism, "Evidence suggests that casino gambling would not bring in new dollars or 
touriSIS. but instead explOIt what already exists in the state. A consistent result of 
the introduction of casino gambling hu been the cannibalization of pre-existing 
tourism i ndustry. ~ ld. at 1. 
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lates fundamental principles of sound tax policy because 
such a revenue source is inequitable, regressive, and 
variable. 
The central premise of this article is that the inherent 
characteristics of legalized gambling activities almost invari· 
ably create pressures for tax increases. These pressures oc-
cur in part because of increased social-welfare costs 
attributed to new gambling operations,4 and in part because 
of increased costs to the criminal justice system.5 Only if 
the new tax revenues can outpace the costs attributed to 
new legalized gambling activities will initiating more legal-
ized gambling activities benefit the taxpayer base. There-
fore, government concern is often focused on when tax 
increases related to legalized gambling's social costs might 
occur and whether they will be covered by any increased 
flow of taxes collected from the legalized gambling activi-
ties. In this regard, according to the 1994 University of 
Massachusetts report analyzing the existing cost/benefit 
studies in these areas, the legalized gambling industry has 
been severely criticized for issuing "unbalanced" industry-
generated reports which were "hiding the costs."6 The so-
cial impacts caused by legalized gambling activities are 
quite expensive; and if taxes collected from gambling enter-
prises do not fully compensate federal , state, and local gov-
ernments for the extra costs, the taxpayers and society as a 
whole ultimately bear the financial burden.7 
4. See, ~g., Economic Impacn, supra note 1, at 90·91 (table); Cong. HUlring, 
supra note 2, at 8-11, 77·81. 211·14 (testimony of Econ. Prof. Earl Grinols. U. HI., 
statement of Prof. John Kind t, U, Ill. , and testimony of Dr. Valerie Lorenz. Exec. 
Dir.. Compulsive Gambling etc.). 
5. See, e.g .• FLA. DEP'T L. ENFORCEMENT, T HE QUESTION OF CASINOS IN 
FLORIDA: INCREASED CRIME: Is IT WORTIi THE GAMBLE? 2 (Aug. 15, 1994) [here-
inafter FLA. INCREASED CRIME] (MAs this report reHeelS, it has been clearly demon-
strated in other jurisdictions thai a significant increast: in crime and its consequences 
accompanies casino gambling. [The Florida Department of Law Enforcement] ... 
joins a large number of other criminal justice entities in OPPOSITION TO ANY FORM 
OF LEGALIZED CASINO GAMBLING.")(Emphasis in original); John W. Kindt. In· 
creased CrIme and LegalizJI1g Gambling Operalions: The Impaclon lhe Socio·Eco· 
nomics oj Business and Governmenl, 30 CRtM. L. BULL. 538 (1994) [hereinafter 
Increased CrimeJ. 
6. See, e_g., CEO REPORT, supra note 2, at 39-40, 68·84; Congo Hearing. supra 
nOle 2, al 4~8 (testimony of Prof. Robert Goodman. U. Mass.). 
7. See supra notes 4-5 and accompanying text. 
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It is easy to understand how politicians and state legis· 
latures are seduced by promises made by gambling propo-
nents.8 A wide ly-used statement by the gambling interests 
is that "legalized gambling constitutes a painless tax."9 
Classic misjudgments by pro-gambling government officials 
can be partially explained by the manner in which legalized 
gambling interests (according to their own internal docu-
ments) have used public relations dollars to surround them-
selves with the auras of " traditional business activities" 
combined with " respectability."10 The threat of potential 
competition from neighboring communities or states can 
further pressure lawmakers to expedite the legalization pro-
cess before their plans for more legalized gambling activi-
ties are pre-empted. 11 
The case of the riverboat casinos in Iowa illustrates the 
use of these tactics by gambling proponents. In 1990, Iowa 
became the first state to legalize riverboat gambling. 12 Offi-
cials were seeking financial relief for communities suffering 
from severe setbacks in the farming and manufacturing in-
8. See, e.g., CE D R EPORT. supra nOie 2, at 22-34. 
9. O IAIULS T . CLOTFELTER & PHILIP J. CooK. SELLING HoP1: 215-32 (Nan 
Bur. Econ. Research, Harvard Univ. Press 1989) [hereinafter CLOTFELTloR & 
COOK]. Fo r example, according to Henry Fie lding, '-A u.ttery is a Taxation, Upon 
all the Fools in CTealion." (1732), ciled in id. at 215. Cofilra Layn Phillips, The Pu-
millm Savings Bond: Rt!Sp~(able Rl!Vt!Ilue Through Legaliud Gambling, 11 TULSA 
L.J. 241 (1975). 
10. See. e.g .• Br,TTER G OV'T ASS' N, STAFF WHITE PAPER: CASINO GAMBLING 
IN CHICAGO apps. p, Q, & R (1992)(copies avai lable from Better Gov't Ass'n, Chi-
cago. III.) (hereinafter BETTER Gov'T ASs'N REPORT]. See also BE"TTER GOV'T 
ASs'N, STATEMENT O N R IV ER BOAT GAMBLING To THE METRO ETHICS COALITION 
PROJ ECT (I994)(with appendices) [hereinafter BElTER Gov'T ASS'N PROJeCT]. 
II. CEO REPORT, supra note 2, at 16,22-24. Nationwide, the governmenl 
decisionmaking processes for increasing legalized gambling activities are littered 
wi th instances of alleged viola tions of state statures, incl uding the improper with-
holding of information from the public. For examples in Ill ino is, see A lf Siewers, 
Gaming Panel flit for Secrecy, CHI. SUN-TI MES, Apr. 15, 1992, at 9 (proposed S2 
billion casino complex for Chicago); Ken Staaf, Secrecy Shrouds Deal in Jo Daviess, 
GALENA G AZETTE (Galena. 111.). Fe b. 18, 1991 , at 8 5 (proposed riverboat); Open 
Meetings A ct Lawsuit Sellled, GALENA GAZE1TE (Galena, 11 1.), May 1, 1991, at I 
(proposed riverboat); Ka thleen Cardella. Paperwork, Short NOllce Help Stifle 01'8 
Opposition , NEwS-G AZETre (Champaign, 111.), Oct. 20, 1991. al B3 (proposed o ff· 
track be tting parlor); see also Wi11iam R. Cooper v. Ill. Dep't Lottery, 640 N.E.2d 
1299 (III . App. O. 1994). cm. den. 647 N. E.2d 1007 (1995)(sui t under 111. Freedom of 
Infonnarion Act to disclose 111 . lottery advertising and marketing techniques). 
12. IOWA CODE, ch. 99F.1 - 99F.18. (Supp. 1995) . 
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dustries. 13 In order to raise revenues, Iowa politicians had 
already approved other government-sanctioned gambling 
activities, including a state lottery, bingo, horse racing, and 
dog tracks.14 There was, however, increased opposition 
among voters to riverboat gambling, as reflected by the op-
position of two local veteran lawmakers, Don Hermann and 
Hugo Schnekloth,IS whose communities were targeted for 
riverboats.16 After receiving assurances from proponents 
that tourists were the target market, legislators became con-
vinced that new jobs and tax revenues could come without 
sacrificing " the integrity of the state."17 To ensure control 
over gambling's negative side effects, they included betting 
limits in addition to limits on losses in the riverboat legisla-
tion. ls Governor Terry Branstad promised citizens prosper-
ity without decadence and a revitalization of river towns as 
he signed the law that legalized riverboat garnbling. 19 
Also in 1990, directly across the river from Iowa, Illi-
nois became the second state to legalize riverboat gam-
bling.20 Competition from Illinois riverboat casinos, which 
had no betting limits, resulted in two of Iowa's five 
riverboats being moved to Mississippi within less than one 
year after they began operations.21 
Bettendorf, Iowa, lost $661,000 in tax subsidies it had 
granted to its riverboat , and these subsidies equaled $28 for 
each citizen in Bettendorf.22 These results were tinged with 
some poetic justice; however, the Bettendorf officials who 
13. Fool's Gold. Sllpra nOle 2. al 22. 
14. Fool's Gold, supra note 2, at 22. See generaffy IOWA RACING & GAMlt'G 
CoMM'N, 1993 ANNUAL REPORT [hereinafter IOWA ANN. REP. 1993J: IowA RACING 
& GAMING COMM'N. 1992 ANNUAL RePORT [hereinafter IOWA ANN. REP. 1992J. 
15. DAVID JOHNSTO"', TEMPLES OF CHANCE-How AMERICA INC. BOUGHT 
OtJT MURDER INC. TO WIN Co'lTROL Of" nlE CAsn,"o BUS'''''ESS 279 (1992) (herein. 
arrer JOHNSTON). 
16. Id. 
17. Fool's Gold, supra note 2, al 22. 
18. See generally IOWA CODE. ch. 99F.9. (Supp. 1995). As crit ics of the Iowa 
casino gambling predicted, Ihe provision limiting losses and betting limits has since 
been deleted. See IOWA CoDE ch. 99F.9(2) (Supp. 1995). 
19. Fool's Gold, supra note 2, at 22. 
20. ILL. REV. STAT. ell. 120, para. 2413 (\992); 230 ILCS 10113 (1994). 
21. IOWA ANN. ReP. 1992, supra note 14, at 1. There were licenses ror 6 boats. 
but they began operations intennittently. 
22. JOHNSTON, supra nOie 15, al 297. 
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had promoted the riverboat had refused to distribute a 
KPMG Peat Manvick analysis indicating that only the 
equivalent of 250 full time jobs would be crealed by a 
riverboat and that the local economy would be negatively 
impactedP 
In Fort Madison, Iowa, taxpayers who had been per-
suaded to assume a 15-year $2.2 million debt to support the 
infrastructure for one of the departing riverboats were left 
wilh nothing bUl a billlotalling between $2.2 million to $2.6 
million.24 The taxpayers had invested funds without requir-
ing a performance bond or other guarantees from the 
riverboat.25 The city manager complained that taxpayers 
"will definitely feel betrayed ."26 Officials said they were 
"flabbergasted. "27 
These events clearly illustrate circumstances in which 
taxpayers directly subsidized legalized gambling ventures 
which did not even materialize. Unfortunately, the connec-
tion between legalized gambling and increased taxes is not 
always so easily observed by politicians or taxpayers. 
B. Logical Flaws in the Pro-Gambling Argument 
t . Legalized Gambling Causes Significant Increases in 
Social Costs 
Legalized gambling creates long-term socio-economic 
problems so large and so costly that it would be an anomaly 
for any taxes received from the activities to cover com-
plete ly the increased costs.2 !1 The recognized socio-eco-
nomic costs are further exacerbated by increases in both 
regulatory and criminal justice system expenses.29 When 
viewed from the relevant taxpayer base (which is usually 
23. JOII),;STO),;, supra note IS. at 279. 
24. JOUNSTON. SI,Pro nOle 15, at 297 . .set auo William Petroski & Ken Fuson, 
River Gambling Deall 810w, DES MOINES REGISTER, May 28, 1992, at A2 [hereinaf· 
ter Gambling Blow]. 
25. Gambling /JIow, supra note 24, at A2. 
26. Gambling Blow. supra note 24, al A2. 
27. Gamblmg Blow. SIIpra note 24, al A2. 
28. See supra notes 4·5 and accompanying text. 
29. See. e.g., FLA. INCRCASED CRIME, supra note 5, at 4·5. See also FLA. Gov. 
ANALYSIS, supra nOle 3, at 71 ·75; FLA. INCRF...ASED CRIME, supro note 5. II I 5·6, 9. 
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regional or statewide in scope ),30 legalized gambling costs 
taxpayers money.31 It is ironic that gambling organizations 
often win legislative approval with their promises of new 
tax revenues, while the legalized gambling interests are di -
rectly and indirectly subsidized by the taxpayers. 
When addressing public and government officials, gam-
bling organizations report the tax dollars they may be re-
quired to pay into local tax coffers, but the large socio-
economic costs that wil1 ultimately be paid by combined 
state welfare agencies (as well as by charitable organiza-
tions)32 are mentioned infrequently. For example, within 
two years after South Dakota initiated what the public 
often terms "hard-core" gambling)) via land-based casinos 
and video-lottery terminals (VLTs), a major charitable or-
ganization in South Dakota 's largest city reported that 
30. Su, e.g .. III. Gov. Press Release 1992, supra note I. See generally VICKI 
APT, JAMES F. SMITI-I & EUGENE MARTIN CHRISTIANSEN, T HE BUSINESS OF RISK: 
CoMMERCIAL GAMBLING IN MAINSTREAM AMERICA (1985). 
31. See, e.g., Fu.. Gov. ANALYSIS, supra note 3, at executi ve summary. 
32. FLA . Gov. ANALYSIS, supra note 3, al executive summary; Todd Nelson, 
S.D. BankruptcIes Down 5 Percent: Judge: Gambling Caused Most Cases. ARGUS 
LEAD!:R (Sioux Falls, S.D.), Jail . 15, 1993, at 1 [hereinafter S.D. Bankruptclesl. 
33. "Harder~ forms of gambling involve the phenomenon of gamblers chasillg 
the "thrill factor." For a discussion of this " thrill factor ~ or ~sensation secking in 
gamblers~ and a review of the re levant literature. see Kenny Coventry & R. lain 
Broy,1l. Sensation Seeking In Gamblers And Non-Gamblers And Its Relation To 
Preferenu For Gambling Activities, Chasing Arousal And Loss DfControll1l Regl/' 
lar Gamblers, GAMBLING BEHAVIOR AND PROBLEM G AMBLING 25 (1993). See also 
Henry R. lesieur, Compulsive Gambling, SOCIETY, May/June 1992. at 43,43-44 
[hereinafter Compulsive Gambling]: 
While pathological gambling does not involve the use of a substance, 
research conducted by numerous scholars has noted Similarity with other 
addictive behaviors. For example, pathological gamblers state that they 
seek "action" as well as money or a means o f escaping from problems-an 
aroused. euphoric state comparable to the "high" derived from cocaine or 
other d rugs. Action means excitement, th rills and tension-"when the ad-
renalin is flowing." The desire to remain in action is so intense that many 
gamblers will go for days without sleep, without eating. and even without 
going to the bathroom. Being in action pushes out all other concerns. 
During the period of anticipation. there is also a "rush," usually character· 
ized by sweaty palms, rapid heart beat, and nausea. 
Pathological gamblers, like alcoholics and drug addicts, are preoccu· 
pied with seeking out gambling; they gamble longer than intended and with 
more money than intended. There is a lso the equi valent of ~ tolerance" 
when gamblers have to increase the size of their bets o r the odds against 
them in order to create the desi red amount of excitement. 
!d. at 43-44. 
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"[t]en percent of the clients who came to the Consumer 
Credit Counseling of Lutheran Social Services of Sioux 
Falls openly admit that gambling underlies their financial 
problems .... "34 Therefore, while there is a misdirection of 
public attention to the tax dollars going 10 "local" tax cof-
fers, legalized gambling activities actually deplete the asset 
base of the state tax coffers. 
Legalized gambling is not a "painless tax, "35 and gam-
bling is definitely not painless, especially to that 10% of the 
population who will become problem economic gamblers36 
(PEGS) or the 1.5% to 5% who will become compulsive 
economic gamblers37 (CEGS). A guaranteed 10% of prac-
tically any U.S. population base will redirect proportion-
ately large amounts of consumer dollars away from the pre-
existing economy and transform those dollars into gambling 
dollars once gambling is legalized by the state government 
(i.e., the ·'acceptability factor"),3S This 10% of the public 
spends 65% of the total gambling dollars . .19 
Gambling also has a tendency to attract those who can 
least afford it; it is well-established that legalized gambling 
activities act as a type of regressive tax on the poor and on 
minority groups,40 People living at the poverty level, often 
lacking an education which would enable them to under-
34. S.D. BankruptCU?5. supra note 32. at L 
35. Steven D. Gold. It's Not a Miracle, It"s a Mirage. ST. LEGIS .. Feb. 1994. at 
28. 2S [hereinafter Gold]. 
36. See generally CLOTFELTER & CooK. supra note 9, at 92-94: Economic Im-
pacts. supra note I, at 60-61. 
37. Economic Impacts. supra note I, at 60-61. This phenomenon is supported 
by a 1995 study which concluded that the lifetime probable pathological and prob-
Jem gamblers in Iowa increased from 1.7% of the public in 1989 10 5.4% in 1995. 
IOWA DEP'T HUMAN SERVICES. GAMBLING AND PROBI_EM GAMBLING IN IOWA: A 
REPLICATION SURVEY 17,31 (July 28,1995); William Petroski, Study: More Gam· 
biers ill Jeopardy, DES MOI'lES REGISTER. Aug. 25, 1995, at AI, A2; New Study 
Sho\\'S Increase in Iowans Having Problems with Gambling, Press Release from 
Iowa Dep·t Human Services (Aug. 24, 1995). 
38. Economic Impacts, supra note 1, at 64; see BElTER GOV'T Ass'N REPORT. 
mpra note 10. at 2, 
39. Economic !mpaclJ. supra note I, at 60-6J. 
40. CLOTFELTER & CoOK. supra note 9, at 215. See also Thomas W. Calmus. 
Measuring the Regre.ssivity of Gambling Taxes, 34 NAT'L TAX J. 267 (1981); Charles 
T. Clotfelter. On the RegreHiviry orState·Operated 'Numbers' Games, 32 NAT'L TAX 
J. 543 (1979); Daniel 8. Suits, Gambling Taxes: Regre.ssivity and Revenue POlelllial, 
30 NAT'L TAX J. 19 (1977). 
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stand the odds against winning, gamble with the hope of 
changing their lives.41 The statistics of lost paychecks. fi-
nancial ruin, crime, incarceration, spousal abuse, child 
abuse and neglect, suicide, and other problems which have 
been documented by social-welfare agencies and charities 
should quickly dispel the notion that legalized gambling 
constitutes a painless tax. The reality is that legalized gam-
bling fuels enonnous social problems:42 
Surveys show that more than 3 out of 5 compulsive 
gamblers engage in criminal activity to support their 
gambling. One-fourth are charged with criminal of-
fenses. Ten percent are convicted and incarcerated or 
given a combination of incarceration and probation. 
Another ten percent are given probation. Compulsive 
gamblers also often lose control of their lives. Associ-
ated job problems lead to lost production, nonpayment 
of taxes, and so on. Adding together the direct crime 
costs (average annual law enforcement, adjudication, 
and detention costs for the typical type of 'white coIlar' 
crime committed by pathological gamblers), incarcera-
tion costs (average confinement costs for a typical crime 
committed by pathological gamblers), and direct regula-
tory costs (cost of operating state regulatory agencies to 
oversee gambling) leads to current-dollar costs per com-
pulsive gambler that range between $14,CX>O and $30,000 
annually.43 
Despite these statistics, numbers touted by gambling 
organizations appear to be an answer to taxpayers ex-
hausted with paying taxes. The large dollar amounts tradi -
tionally spent by legalized gambling organizations on public 
relations44 mislead large segments of the public as to how 
41. Earl Grinols. Gambling Is Bad Business For Local Economy, Society. 
NEwS-GAZETTE (Olampaign, IlL). Sept. 29. 1991. at B3 (guest commentary by 
&on. Prof. Earl Grinols, U. Ill.) [hereinafter Gambling Is Bad Busin~s). 
42. MD. DEP'T H EALTII & MENTAL HYGIENE, ALCOHOL & DRUG ABUSE AD. 
MIN. , TASK FORCE ON GAMBLING ADDICTION IN MARYLAND 2 (Valerie C. Lorenz & 
Roben M. Politzer co-chairs, 1990) [hereinafter MARYL4.ND REPORT)' 
43. Cong. Hearing, supra nOie 2 at 72 (wrl llcn testimony of Econ. Prof. Earl 
Grinols, U. III.). The fi nancial damage gambling creates is eqUivalent to the costs o f 
a recession (like the one experienced in 1990-91 when los t GOP was $306 billion) 
every 8 to 15 years. /d. at 73. 
44. In Illinois. the sponsors of the proposed 1992 casino complex in Chicago 
spent at least $5 million to $5.5 million in public relations dollars to convince the 
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much legalized gambling actually costs and who is paying 
the bill. Throughout the United States, a summary of the 
fie ld research indicates that for every dollar legalized gam-
bling activities actually contribute in tax revenues, taxpay-
ers are really losing three dollars or more.4S Skeptics argue 
that disguised behind public relations dollars46 and irrele-
vant issues,47 the gambling interests lump together every 
conceivable tax dollar they might hypotbetically have to 
pars and then round that number into a public relations 
sum suitable for public consumption.49 A 1992 Gallup poll 
indicated that 57% of the public agreed (while 41 % dis-
agreed) that legalized state-sponsored gambling provided 
state legislatu re to legalize land-based casino gambling. Patrick T. Reardon & Rick 
Pearson, CasUIO firms fose pati£nu, CHI. TRIB .. Dec. 4. 1992, § 2. at 1. 1 (hereinafter 
Reardon & Pea~on); Ray Long & Charles N. Wheeler III , City Owned CasUIO 
Floared, CHI. SUN-TIMES, Feb. 20. 1993, a t 3 (sponso~ of the 1992 Chicago Casino 
complex spent $5.5 million) {hereinafte r Long & Wheeler). 
45. For a table indicating these costs. see Economic ImpaclS. supra note I, al 
'X}-96. These numbe~ are also suppon ed by specific state examples. Sa, ~g .. 
MARYLAND REPORT, supra nOle 42. The costs 10 the Slate of Maryland were $1.5 
billion per year. MARYLAND R EPORT, supra note 42. at 2. See also FLA. Gov, 
ANALYSIS. supra note 3. at executive summary (approximately $8-$12 in costs for 
every $1 in new lax revenuC5 from casino-style gambling); Congo Hearing. supra note 
2 at 77 (statement of Prof. John Kindt. U. 11 1.)(atleasl 53 in new social costs for each 
dollar in new tax revenues from legalized gambling activi ties). 
46. Set supra note 44 and accompanying text. Reardon & Pea~on, supra note 
44. at I ($5 mill ion in a Chicago scenario); Long & Wheeler. supra note 44. at 3 ($5.5 
million est imated for the same Chicago scenario). BElTER GovY Ass'N REPORT. 
supra note 10, apps. p, Q. & R. The sponso~ of the complex were criticized as not 
reporting all the dolla~ they spent on lobbying efforts. Max Ragozzo, Casino SIIP-
porters Viowle Lobby Law, ILL. POL., Sept. 1992. at 10: Press Release. Common 
Cause Calls For Investigation Into Casino Violations Of Lobby Law (Aug. 5, 
1992)(copy on file with 111. Common Cause. Chicago. Ill.); Letter from Tracy Litsey. 
Exec. Dir. III. Common Cause to Roland Burris, III. All) Gen'l (Aug. 5,1992) (copy 
on file with III. Common Cause, Chicago. III.); Leller from Tracy Litsey. Exec, Dir. 
III. Common Cause to Jack O'Malley, Cook County Ill. St. AII'y (Aug. 5, I 992)(copy 
on file wi th I ll. Common Cause, Chicago , Ill.). 
47. See Dr. D.L. Dan Ireland. C hai r. Address at Nat' l Conference of the Nat'] 
Coalition Against Legalized Gambling in Branson, Mo. (Mar. II, 1995): Interview 
with Prof. John Kindt, U. III ., in Champaign, Ill. (June 6 & 7, 1992)(broadcasl on 
"Illinois Journal," WCIA-Channel 3). 
48, See, e.g .. PROPOSED GAMBLING FACILITY REPORT, supra note 1. at 270-1 1. 
49. PROPOSED GAMBLING FACILITY REPORT. Sf/pra note I , at 270-71. See also 
Edward Walsh, Chicago May Gambie On Casino Proposal. WASH. POST. May 24. 
1992, at A3 [hereinafter Walsh); Dr. David S. Robertson, Vice·Chai r, Address al 
Nat' l Conference of the Nat"! Coa li tio n Against Legalized Gambling in Branson. 
Mo. (Mar. 11. 1995), 
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"much-needed revenue for programs, such as education 
and senior citizens."50 However, even basic economic 
sources refute tbis public misperception, because "revenues 
from gambling do not appreciably fatten most municipal or 
slate budgets,',s l and gambling has not "lived up to its 
promises as an engine for revitalizing cities, or even for pro-
viding extra revenues for education or social programs. " 52 
2. Pre-Existing Businesses Suffer 
Legalized gambling clearly brings societal problems to 
communities, and it also has a substantial negative impact 
on exis ting businesses in those communities. It is virtually 
impossible for non-gambling businesses to compete for con-
sumer dollars being spent in gambling establishments by 
problem gamblers and compulsive gamblers because this 
market segment consists of those patrons subject to the ad-
dictive tendencies associated with compulsive gambling, as 
recognized by the American Psychiatric Association.s3 
Once gambling is legalized, these particular consumer dol-
lars become lost to the pre-existing economy. Accordingly, 
non-gambling businesses are at a large competitive 
disadvantage. 
Gambling parlors claim they are just taking "entertain-
ment dollars" from, for example, movie theaters; or "recre-
ational dollars" from, for example, the sports industry; or 
"discretionary dollars" from family activities. In reality, 
however, the legalized gambling parlors are taking basic 
"consumer dollars" from pre-existing non-gambling econo-
mies and their businesses. The potential base amount 
which legalized gambling operations can divert and drain 
out of a specified economy per year consists of approxi-
mately $1,000 multiplied by 10% of the population of the 
relevant geographic market.S4 
50. NEWS SERVICE, THE GALLUP ORGAN!ZATlON, at 2 (Dec. 5, 1992) 
(Princeton, N.J.). 
51. WORLD BOOK YEAR BOOK 400 (1994). 
52. Id. 
53. AM. PsYCH!ATRIC ASS'N. DI"GNOSTIC AN D STATISTICAL MANUAL Of 
MENTAL DISORDERS § 312.31, 615-18 (l994)("palhological gambling"). 
54. Su, e.g .. Economic Impacts, supra note 1, at 60, 77. In a specific example, a 
Wisconsin report concluded that '"[w)ithout considering the social costs of compul-
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Another way to illustrate this problem is to visualize 
two hotels in the same town that are also the only two ho· 
leis for 100 miles. If the quality, price, and convenience of 
the hotels are equal, each hotel would have approximately 
50% of the local hotel market. If one of the hotels were 
suddenly to acquire a liquor license and a bar, then a cer-
tain percentage of the hotel market would automatically 
leave the second hotel and go to stay at the hotel with the 
bar. In addition, a certain percentage of the local public 
(formerly not part of the local hotel market) would also 
visit the hotel just to get an alcoholic drink. increasing hotel 
revenues at the expense of other local businesses. The bar 
is not just a marketing advantage, it caters to, among 
others, an addicted and potentially·addicted clientele. To 
win back its share of the hotel market, the second hotel 
must ge t a bar of its own. 
Similarly, if the same two hotels each start with 50% of 
the hotel market , and one hotel gets the only legalized gam· 
bling facility within 100 miles, the second hotel is immedi· 
ately going to lose a guaranteed 10% of its customers (i.e., 
the PEGS)55 with another 42%56 tending to leave and stay 
at the gambling hotel. The same percentages would apply 
to the overall populace within the 100·mile parameters -
although the farther they were from the gambling parlor, 
the less likely the people in the 42% group would be to 
travel to the gambling parlor. The 10% market, however, 
would be very inclined to travel the 100 miles, if necessary, 
to gamble. Again, the non·gambling hotel would be at a 
si'lc gambling. the 'rest-of-the-sta te' areas lose-or. transfer in-$223.94 million to 
the local gaming areas. Considering the lowest estimated social costs of problem 
gambling. the res t of . . . (Wisconsin) loses $318.61 million to gambling." WILU",M 
THO"PSON, RICARDO GA.ZEL. & D AN RIC KMAN. THE ECONOMIC IMPACT OF N ... 
TIVE AMERICA.N GAMINO IN WISCUNSIN I (Wis. Pory Research inst. Rep. 1995). 
This report also concluded that without casino gambling, many local citizens would 
have increased participation in o lher "outside" activit ies: "More than 10% of the 
locals would spend more on groceries if it were not for the casino, while nearly one-
fourth would spend more on clothes. Thirty-scven percent said that their savings 
had been reduced since the casino had opened .... " THOMPSON, mpra. at 2. Se~ 
Ragen Worthington, Poor Get Poorer at Tribal CarmoJ, Says Study of Wisconsin 
MGamert", CHI. TRIa., Apr. 11.1995, at 1. 
55. See, e.g. , Economic Impacts, supra note I, at 60, 77. 
56. See, e.g., Economic Impacts, slIpra note 1, at 60-61. See aLIO CL.OTFEL"JCR 
& COOK. 5upra nOle 9, at 92-94. 
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competHlve disadvantage while overall, more consumer 
dollars were being channeled into the gambling hotel. 
It could be argued that this comparison would apply 
equally well to two slates instead of two hotels,57 but the 
comparison fails when long·term effects of legalized gam· 
bling are considered. In the short·run, a state that offered 
gambling would profit by attracting morc tourists than a 
neighboring state that did not offer gambling, but in the 
mid-term to long-term, the gambling state would be at a 
disadvantage because of the large socia-economic costs 
gambling would create. Businesses would also prefer to ID-
eate in the gambling-free stateS8 because of its comparably 
better community and business environments.59 
In the scenario involving the liquor license, a corollary 
issue involves whether the hotel with the exclusive liquor 
license would experience more demand for hotel rooms and 
whether this increased demand would translate into a posi-
tive multiplier effect. With other factors being equal, bow-
ever, the competing hotel would theoretically experience a 
corresponding net decline in demand for hotel rooms which 
would translate into an offsetting negative multiplier effect. 
Theoretically, this scenario is still a zero-sum hypothetical. 
However, in the context of legalizing new gambling ac-
tivities, the "acceptability" and "accessibility" factors 
unique to the industry"'l mean that new industry-specific so-
cial costs also arise.61 These costs apparently exacerbate 
the negative multiplier effect calculated to be inherent al-
ready in legalized gambling activities.f52 As a caveat, it 
57. Since a state has a strategic geographic marke t size. a comparison in this 
context of twO SUlIe5: to IwO local holels would fai l. 
58. See gOlt!faUy John W. Kindl. The Negalive lmpacu Of ugaliud Gambling 
On /JuJines!t!J. 4 U. MIAMI Bus. L.J. 93,113-24 (\994). 
59. ld. at 105-13. 
60. See, e.g., I3E1TFR Gov·r AsS'N REPORT, supra note 10. at 14-15. 
61. St!I!, e.g., BE1TFR Gov· r Ass'N REPORT, mpra note 10. at 14-15. 
62. CED RF..PORT. Jllp ra note 2, at 50 ('·ncgath'c multiplier effect"). In some 
scenarios, such as Atlantic City, experts were apparently surprised that C\"en the 
initial "multiplier effect ... Iwas) much lower than ell"pected." Paul Teske & Bela 
Sur, Winners and. LoserJ: POII/ICS, Casino Gambling, and Dl!Velopmem in AI/anJIC 
CiIY. 10 POL·Y STUDII:S REv. 130,136 (1991). This observation would mean that 
corresponding losses from a "regionally" heal thy economy would no longer result in 
11 :/!ero-sum hypothetical but in a "net" negative multiplier effect caused by the ad-
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should be noted that for decades the U.S. population base 
has been exposed to widespread alcoholic consumption and 
that the societal costs associated with alcoholic consump~ 
tion have already been largely internalized in U.S. society. 
Such is not the case with regard to compulsive gambling, 
which has many new societal costs yet to be internalized in 
society.63 
Pre-existing and prospective new businesses aTC fur-
ther discouraged by the extent of the concessions and tax 
breaks being given to gambling organizations. In Illinois, 
for example, the public is told that riverboat casinos pay 
20% in taxes. However, an examination of the Il1inois 
Riverboat Act ,64 which contains provisions heavily influ-
enced by the riverboat iobby,6S and which was largely 
drafted without benefit of public scrutiny,66 reveals that the 
widely-touted 20% is really 20% of "adjusted gross reve-
vent of lega lized gambling. The result of an eXlensive 1995 study in WISCOnsin can 
be interpreted as lending su~tllntial confirmation to this phenomenon of a "net" 
negative mulliplier effect. TilOMrsON ET AL., supra note 54, at 1-2. 
63. See, e.g., BeTTER Gov'r Ass'N R EPORT, mpra note 10, at 14-15. 
64. lu_. RI3V. STAT. ch. 120, para. 2413 (1992). 
65. See OPEN LETTER TO THE MEMBEJlS OF TIiE ILL HOUSF OF REPRESEl'o"TA_ 
'I IVES, 86nt Ges. ASSEMBLY, FROM Gov. J AMC$ TtlOMI'SOS (Sept. 10, 1990): Rose-
mary T. Garhart, Shed Light On Gambling, NeWS-OAZErTlO (Champaign, Ill.), July 
10.1990. at A41hereinafter Shed Light]: 
If there's one area of state governmentlhat seems ripe for corruption, 
it's the state's gambling interests. 
With the hint or corruption ever near, you'd think lawmakers \\'mud go 
out of their way to make sure all decisions about Illinois' escalating spon· 
sorship of gambling be made openly and above board. 
But il seems some of the most importa", discussions about riverboat 
gambling will be made below deck. 
In a lillie publicized section of a bill that would allow riverboat gam-
bling licenses for East SI. Louis and Jolie t, the Legislature agreed last 
mOnlh to exempt the licensing board from the state's Open Meetings Act. 
That means discussions about who should be awarded licenses and 
even the awards themselves can be done behind dosed doors, without pub-
lic input and with no witnesses. 
Presumably. the board wouldn't even have 10 tell anyone when it was 
meeting or keep minutes of its meetings. 
See generoUy ST. ILL., House OF REPRESEI'ofl"ATIVES AND SENATE TRANSCRIPTS, 
86TH GEN'L AsSeMBLY, al88, 93·94,104,109,110 (June 22,1989); ST. ILL, Housp. 
OF REPRESEI'ofl"ATIVES AND SENAn! TRANSCRIPTS, 86TIi OEN'L ASSEMf!,L Y, at 46, 47-
48,52 (Jan. 11,1990). Seea/so ST. ILL., HOUSE or RErRESE NTATIVES AND SENAn:;: 
TRANSCRIPT'S,86TH GEN'L ASS EM ALY, at 243-44 (May 26,1989). 
66. Shed Light, supra note 65, at A4. 
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nue. "67 Critics imply that the deferral of taxes exceptions 
and other nuances in the procedures utilized for calculating 
"adjusted gross revenue" can result in the riverboats paying 
fewer taxes than traditional businesses.68 
Legislators do have limits, however, and Illinois legisla-
tors reached theirs when Hilton Hotels, Caesar's World, 
and Circus, Circus, the sponsors of a proposed $2-billion ca-
sino complex for Chicago, requested they be required to 
pay only 10% in taxes instead of the usual 20%.69 The 
sponsors argued that "10% of something is better than 20% 
of nothing. "70 They had, in fact, also set the stage for finess-
ing the 10% down to 7.7%? However, the casino sponsors 
committed a strategic faux pas by demanding their tax con-
cessions before the casino complex was legalized by the 
state legislature. The demand received a cool response 
from most Illinois legislators, and it undermined the argu-
ments of the casino's sponsors by revealing that the casino 
complex would not be filling the state's tax coffers as much 
as had been previously promised.72 
3. Normal Sales Tax Revenues Decrease 
Contributions made by gambling organizations to state 
and local tax coffers must be examined and balanced with 
the following in mind: unlike non-gambling firms, gambling 
firms do not generally pay sales taxes on most of the dollars 
flowing through their establishments. For example, if 
$1,000 was spent on a new refrigerator in Illinois during 
67. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 120, para. 2413 (1992), 230 ILCS IOtl3 (1994); see ILL. 
ECON. & FISCAL COMM'N. WAGERING IN ILLINOIS 55 (1992) (Riverboat Gambling) 
[hereinafter ILL. ECON. CoMM·N). See also ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 8, para. 37-2 (1992); 
ILL. ECON. CoMM'N, supra, at 31. 
68. Tom Hemandez, Shell Game? Expert: Casino a Losing Proposilioll For 
Aurora, BEACON-NEWS (Aurora. 111.). Jan. 27,1992. at Ai, A5 [hereinafter Losing 
Proposition]. 
69. BEITER Goy'r ASS'N REPORT. supra note 10. app. P, at 5-8. This reper! 
reveals the "iflternal" tactics of the public relations campaign to convince the public 
to accept the tax reduction from 20% down to 10%. Id. '"10% of something is 
better than 20% of nothing." Id. at 5. 
70. BE11'cR Gov'T ASS'N REPORT, supra note 10. at 5. 
71. PROPOSED GAMBLING FACILITY REPORT, supra note I, at 271 (projecting 
the gaming tax at either 7.7% or 10%). 
n. See generally, BETTER GOy'T ASS'N REPORT, supra note 10. apps. P & Q. 
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1994, total sales taxes collected were between $62.50 and 
$72.50, depending on the community. If the same $1,000 
were lost on a wager in an off-track betting parlor (OTB), 
there were no sales taxes per se collected. "Wagers" are 
generally non-taxable events, as far as sales taxes are 
concerned. 
To make the example more dramatic, if $1 million per 
year is spent on durable and nondurable goods in a typical 
Tllinois community, the sales taxes collected are between 
$62,500 and $72,500, but those sales taxes are not collected 
if that $1 million is diverted to "wagers." It should also be 
noted that the $1 million lost in bets has also been diverted 
away from the goods and services being offered by the pre-
existing non-gambling businesses. In addition to losing 
these consumer dollars to legalized gambling, businesses 
and taxpayers in general are required to pay more taxes to 
address the new social-welfare problems created by gam-
bling. As gambling becomes legalized and accessible to 
more consumers, the social-welfare costs increase propor-
tionally. The net effect is that the introduction of legalized 
gambling organizations drains pre-existing economies, 
reduces sales tax revenues, and redistributes the tax burden 
disproportionately back to the pre-existing economy. 
Field research indicates the results that can typically be 
expected. In Champaign, Illinois, with a local market popu-
lation of approximately 275,000,13 a proposed OTB prom-
ised to pay a projected $450,000 per year in total taxes14 
(not just sales taxes, which the aTB would collect on food 
and drink sales) to the city and county. An economic anal-
ysis demonstrated that this amount had to be reduced by 
$185,000 to $260,000 to compensate for lost sales taxes 
73. CENSUS BUI(" U,S. DEP'T CoMMIlRCE. 1990 CENSUS, reprinted In THE 
WORLD ALMANAC 406·07,432 (1 993). 
74. Critics charged that the promised tal revenues drifted upward from 
1436,000 to $450,000 as public criticism increased. In 1992, the actual ta;l;cs recch'cd 
were $104,000 [or the first 6 months or approximately 50% less than what was prom-
ised by the "experts" in the arB company. J. Phihp Bloomer. Local OTB Slow Out 
O/The Gare, NEwS-GAZETIE (Champaign, 111.), Nov. 22,1992. at A l21hereinafter 
OT8 Slow ]. 
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alone.7s In addition, the 100 new jobs promised by the aTB 
company actually materialized as 50 full-time and "part-
time" jobs.16 Considering that the local population could 
expect the aTB to create a new population of well over 
1,000 problem economic gamblers, cause increased crime, 
and generate new social-welfare costs in the millions of dol-
Jars,77 the public did not benefit from the OTB. 
By the end of 1993 these types of resuhs were also ap-
pearing in the Illinois riverboat communities. The net re-
sult for the Illinois riverboat communities was that those 
communities had not experienced the promised net gains in 
jobs and might have experienced some declines.78 Further-
more, contrary to promises of an economic boom by legal-
ized gambling interests, these communities had no 
"identifiable increase in returned general merchandise sales 
taxes."79 
4. Local Economic Development Often Comes al the 
Expense of the Stale and Regional Economies 
While the potential legalized gambling market is huge 
and while that market is theoretically 100% of the adult 
and teenage population, the numbers of dollars which can 
be generated do have Iimits.so Therefore, legalized gam-
bling organizations want to be the fust into any given geo-
graphic market with what the public terms the "hardest" 
(or most "thrilling") forms of gambling.S ! Of course, this 
means that once gambling is legal ized in a state, the gam-
bling interests must utilize their profits continually to push 
75. Earl Gnnols, Analysis of the Major Impacts of On-Track Gambling in 
Champaign, Illinois, Sept. 23, 1991 (report by Econ. Prof. Earl L Grinols. U. Ill.) 
[hereinafter Gnnols Champaign Report]. 
76. orB Slow, supra nOle 74. al A12. 
77. See, e.g., Economic ImpaclS. Sllpra note!. at 90-91 (table). 
78. See Earl L Gnnols. Bluff or Winning Hand? RivuboOl Gambling and Re-
gional Employment and Unemployment, ILL Bus. REV., Spring 1994, at 8; see auo 
Earl L. Grinols. Gambling IU Economic Policy: Enumera/ing Why Losses Exceed 
Gams. ILL Bus. REv., Spring 1995. at 6. 
79. ILL. ECONOMIC & FISCAL CoMM'N, WAGERiNG IN ILLINOIS: A REPORT 
UPDATING THE ECONOMIC IMPACT OF GAMBLING ACTIVITIES 28 (1994) [hereinaf-
ter ILL ECON. CoMM'N UPDATE 1994]. 
BO. See generally CLOTFELTER & CooK, supra nOle 9. 
81. Su gt!nerally supra note 33 and accompanying text. 
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for expansion into more and "harder" forms of gambling. 
If this process of expanding gambling activities is allowed to 
proceed. the relevant economy eventually implodes, after 
which history reveals that gambling is usually 
recriminalized.82 
A typical gambling dollar would tend to move from a 
state lottery to the racetracks (if geographically convenient, 
vice versa if not convenient), to off-track betting (the race-
track comes to the gambler) ,8l to riverboat gambling.84 to 
casino gambling (with more and different "show" gim-
micks), to video-machine gambling (including gambling 
particularly for teens and pre-teens), to harder, far more 
thrilling gambling,SS ad infinitum. In Illinois this process of 
gambling dollars migrating to other forms of gambling may 
already be manifesting itself,86 and "analysts have predicted 
that if Chicago gets casino gambling, Illinois river towns 
will lose business on the casino riverboats."H7 Although 
gambling dollars will tend to migrate, this process may not 
manifest itself if the softer type of gambling is attracting 
new dollars faster than its o ld dollars are moving on to 
other "harder" forms of gambling. 
82, CLmTI::LTER & COOK. supra note 9. at 37: I. Nelson Rose, GamblIng's Faff: 
You Carl Bel On 1(, L.A. TH.IES, Aug. 17, 1989, § 11 , at 7 [hereinafter Gamblmg's 
Fall). 
83. The ovcrall reduction from 199110 1992 in the amounts wagered in every 
one of thC II Illinois OTBs functioning both of these years may reflecl the migration 
of OTB gambling dollars, Set' OTB Slow, Sllpra note 74, at A1 2. By 1995. arB 
companies were publicly expressing their concerns. "The Hoa ting caSinoS ha\'e hurl 
OTBs generally but ... [one J11inois riverboat] more than most because of the prox-
Imlty" . [the President of one OTBI said." J. Phill ip Bloomer, Par·A ·D,et Sinks 
OTB Parlor in ProriD, NEwS-GAZElTE (Champaign. 111.). Sept. 30, 1995, at A I. A2. 
84, OTB Slow, supra note 74, at A12. A dramatic migralion of gambling dol· 
lars has been reponed in Iowa, the tlrsl state 10 legalize riverboat gamblillg. Com· 
p(lre IOWA ANN. REP. 1993, supra note 14, at 1-2, wilh IOWA Ai'.:-.I. RI.;I'. 1992. supra 
nOte 14, ar 1. 
85. See CompulsIve Gambliflg, mpra nore 33, a{ 42. 
86. Su ILL. ECON, CoMM'N UI'OATE 1994, supra note 79, at executive sum-
mary. The Illinois State Budget rcvenues 10 Ihe lllinois lonery in 1993 were down 
S24 million, and in 1991. {hey were down SI4 million.ld. a117; ILL. Eco:-.l, CoMM'N. 
supra note 67, al 65, This trend could have been a function of the reccssion but it 
probably was not. bealuse people tend to gamble more in poor economic times. Su 
gtnerally CLOTfELTER & COOK, Jupra nOte 9. See supra notes 81, 83 and accompa· 
nying text. 
87, WORLD BOOK YEAR BOOK 398 (1994). 
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The apparent success of Las Vegas is an exception be-
cause 80% to 90% of its clientele comes from outside Ne-
vada, and particularly from California, and thus, Las Vegas 
is not depending on its own inhabitants for gambling dol-
lars.88 In order to provide local economic development, 
gambling must draw more money to a region than it 
removes. The result of this economic fact is that not only 
do neighboring states compete with each other for gam-
bling dollars, neighboring communities within the same 
state ultimately compete for gambling dollars. If looked at 
from a national or even statewide perspective, it is clear 
that revenues being promised regionally cannot all materi-
alize simultaneously. When a gambling establishment does 
not have enough of a "head start" against its neighbors, the 
local economy will not receive enough revenues to cover 
the social costs of gambling in the community. As a result, 
the cycle of implementing ever more thrilling (or harder) 
forms of gambling to meet the competition continues and 
the concomitant social costs intensify. 
C. Case Example: Arlington International Racecourse 
Arlington International Racecourse, a horse racetrack 
located in Arlington Heights, Illinois, burned to the ground 
in 1985. The racetrack remained closed until 1989 when re-
building was complete. The situation provides an opportu-
nity to examine the effects of the loss of the racetrack on 
the village of Arlington Heights.89 Despite claims that the 
local economy would suffer a $25.9 million loss each year 
the track was closed,90 village records show that from 1985 
to 1989, property tax rates declined, sales tax revenue in-
creased, unemployment declined, and total property assess-
88. CALlI'. Gov. OFFICE Of PLANN ING & RESEARCH, CALIFORNIA AND NE-
VADA: SUBSIDY, MONOPOLY, AND COMPETITIVE EFl'ECTS OF LEGALIZED GAM. 
BUNG 1 (1992). 
89. Mark Ellenson. "An Analysis of the Economic Impact of the Closing of 
Arlington International Racecourse, Illinois," oU/lined in Letter from Mark Ellenson 
10 the Mayor, City Council, and City Manager of Arlington Heights, Ill., J uly 17, 
1994 1hcrcinaftcr Ellcnson]. 
90. Oallc Urbanek, Now It's Do or Die For Arlington Park, DAILY HERALD 
(Arlington Heights, 1ll.) . Oct. 15, 1985, § 1, at 4. 
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ments increased.9 ! Total property assessments increased 
even after the valuation of the racetrack declined 50% fol-
lowing the fire. 92 The data suggests that the negative im-
pact of the track closing was offset by money being spent at 
other local businesses. As a result, more taxable goods 
were sold, and new jobs were created to replace those lost 
at the track.93 More property was developed or improved 
to increase the total property value in the village.94 As a 
result, it was possible to lower property tax rates without 
losing tax revenuesYs Other factors may have been largely 
responsible for this economic growth, but this field research 
provides some empirical evidence strongly suggesting that 
legalized gambling activities do not constitute the essential 
economic base touted by gambling proponents. 
Despite these findings, and as a result of pressure from 
the racetrack management, Governor James Thompson 
signed a law reducing the pari-mutual tax rate in Illinois 
from 7.75% to 2%,96 which arguably constituted a direct tax 
subsidy. Immediately following the bill signing ceremony, 
owners committed to rebuilding the track.')7 
II. PECULIARITIES OF THE GAMBLING INDUSTRY 
A. Gambling Reduces the National Income 
Gambling differs from other forms of entertainment. 
Legalized gambling organizations promote activities which 
cater to a compulsive disorder and can become an addictive 
91. Evenson, supra nOle 89. 
1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 
property lax rates 1.401 1.319 1.245 1.292 1.171 
(per SIOO of equalized assessed valuation) 
sales laX" revenue 6.6 7.2 8.5 8.7 9.6 
(millions of dollars) 
unemployment 5.3% 4.2 % 3.9% 3.1% 2.8% 
total property assessments 693 743 800 876 941 
(millions of dollars) 
92. Evenson, supra note 89, at 1. 
93. See Evenson, supra nole 89, at 1·2. 
94. Evenson, supra note 89, at 1·2. 
95. Evenson, supra note 89, at 1·2. 
96. 230 ILCS 5f25 (1994). 
97. Back On Track: ArlingtOn international, D AILY HERALD (Arlington 
Heights. Ill.) , June 25, 1989. § 1, at 6. 
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activity for large numbers of people; gambling activities 
thereby create social costs that the non·gambling public 
must pay. Since 10% of the public will become problem 
economic gamblers once gambling is legalized and made 
generally accessible,98 this public sector is definitely gam-
bling beyond the limits of recreation and in this scenario 
gambling reduces national income by decreasing productiv-
ity. 'This problem is not a result of individuals who gamble 
for entertainment, but of compulsive and problem gamblers 
who gamble "to make money."99 This type of gambling 
uses time and resources that could be applied toward creat-
ing new goods or services. Instead, there is a sterile transfer 
of money without productivity.IOO 
B. Gambling Results in a Concen1ration of Money 
and Influence 
It should also be highlighted that, historically, legalized 
gambling interests have significantly influenced the draft-
ingWJ of the legislation regulating, monitoring, taxing, and 
even promoting legalized gambling. I02 Criminal justice au-
thorities almost uniformly agree that the concentration of 
money and influence in the industry makes it ripe for cor-
ruption and infiltration by organized crime. 103 It can also 
be argued that the basic strategy of legalized gambling in-
terests is to misdirect public debate and focus only on posi-
tive economic information concerning legalized gambling to 
influence politicians and to shape public perception, and 
that gambling interests are notorious for their expertise in 
98. See supra nOles 55·56 and accompanying lext. 
99. Congo Hearing, supra note 2, at 8 (oral testimony of Econ. Prof. Earl Gri· 
nols. U. III) 
lOll. Congo Helmng, supra nole 2. at 71 ·72 (written testimony of Econ. Prof. Earl 
Grinols, U. IlJ.). 
101. For an example of Chicago City Hall drafting legisla tion for the Illinois 
legislature on behalf of a proposed 1992 casino complex for Chicago, see Fran 
Spielman. Daley Blasls Crime Pant!. Ou SUN-TIMES, June 19, 1992, at 3. 
102. For examples of misdirection strategies frequently utilized by the gambling 
interests, see L Nelson Rose, Currem Issues in Gambling Laws, 8 WHITTlER L. REV. 
245.252-62 (1986) [hereinafter Gambling LAws). 
10]. BElTER GOV'T ASS'N REPORT. supra notc 10, at 76-95; FLA. INCREASED 
CRtME. supra nOle 5. at 2, 6·8: see Increased Crime, supra note 5, at 538. 
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implementing this strategy. l04 This is not to say that other 
industries do not seek political influence; the differences are 
the degree of intensity and the methodologies utilized to 
achieve the political objectives. 
The result of the political influence wielded by legal-
ized gambling concerns can be observed when the following 
economic hypothetical is considered. The negative socio-
economic impact of legalized gambling can be compared to 
a factory that significantly pollutes the environment, 
thereby creating costs and problems for the surrounding 
community. To decrease the amount of pollution being 
pumped into the environment, the government might col-
lect extra taxes from the factory owners based on the quan-
tity of pollution created. 1his type of tax provides two 
advantages: first , it creates an incentive for the owners to 
develop a cleaner, and perhaps a less expensive method of 
production, and secondly, the taxes collected can be applied 
to cleaning up the pollution or enhancing the community in 
other ways. A principal consequence of the tax is to drive 
up the cost of production, which in turn increases the price 
and ultimately reduces demand for the product. As a re-
sult, production and its accompanying pollution tend to be 
reduced. The alternative to taxation is for government to 
simply regulate the polluting industry. The overall societal 
goal is to "internalize the externalities"; that is, to place the 
entire costs of the pollution on the factory creating the pol-
lution. However, since the social costs associated with le-
galized gambling activities are so large, it does not appear 
possible to internalize the negative externalit ies to the 
industry .105 
Yet, unlike most "polluting" businesses, legalized gam-
bling organizations have enjoyed tax concessions, not tax 
increases. These concessions may include free land or in-
frastruclurey>ti For example, in 1994 the $lOO-million Dun-
bar resort with casino-style gambling proposed for 
Deadwood, South Dakota was granted a $7 million tax 
104. See generally CED REPORT, supra note 2. at 16-18,68·84; Gamblmg Laws, 
supra note 102. at 252·56. 
105. See supra note 45 and accompanying text. 
106. See Gambling Blow, supra note 24 and accompanying teKI. 
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break by the Deadwood City Commission,t°7 a $1.75 mil-
lion infrastructure grant by the State Board of Water and 
Natural Resources,l os and a Department of Transportation-
installed underpassyl9 Applications in 1994 for further 
grants included $1.6 million for an outdoor amphitheater110 
and $2.5 million for rebuilding railroad tracks for transpor-
tation to the resort. ]]! More commonly, concessions in-
clude a partial or even a total 5-year tax waiver. ll2 For 
example, after being approved, in part by pledging to pro-
vide large tax revenues , a proposed off-track betting parlor 
in Danville, Illinois requested and received a partial 5-year 
tax waiver in 1990.113 A similar scenario repeated itself in 
1991 in a nearby community, Champaign , lIlinois, which 
was also asked to grant a partial tax waiver.114 
C. Gambling Es1ablishments Can Earn Windfall Profi1s 
A 5-year tax waiver is particularly devastating to tax 
coffers, because most of a gambling enterprise's gross reve-
nues115 are generated during the first five years l16 due to a 
"novelty factor" and more importantly, because of the ad-
107. $7 Mil/wn 1ilX Break Approved For Cosmers. THE PLAINSMAN (Huron. 
S. D.). May 12. 1994, al 1. 
108. Pat Dobbs, $1 Million Grant For Resort Water: Costners Will Not Have To 
Pay It Back, RAPID CITY J. (Rapid City, S.D.). Mar. 15. 1994, at AI, A2. 
109. Deadwood Seeks Funds To Help Resort, ARGUS LEADER (Sioux Falls, 
S.D.), Nov. 23, 1994. at 84. 
110. !d. 
111 Lead Voters Support Dunbar Railroad Plan . ARGUS LEADER (Sioux Falls, 
S.D.), Dec. I, 1994, at B1. 
112. In Louisiana, new "businesses" receive a total 10-year tax waiver. Even 
supporters of some legalized gambling ventures are becoming disgruntled with the 
tax waivers. In referencing an off-track betting parlor's request for a S-year tax 
waiver. one paper supporting the OTB editorialized. "There's nothing wrong with 
providing incentives to business growth . BUl the danger is that all will want 
what one gets. even the truly undeserving." Gambling Subsidies. NEwS-GAZr.:rn:. 
(Champaign, Ill.), Aug. 13, 1990, at A4. 
113. Laura Frank, State OKs OTB Rebate Plan , DANVILLE CoMMERCIAL-NEWS 
(Danville. 111.), Aug. 16, 1990. at AI. AlO. 
114. See, e.g., Letter from William Thurman. Pres .. Inter-Track Partners. to the 
Mayor of Champaign, Ill. (May 31. 1990)("lnter-Track Partners respectfully asks 
that the City pass an ordinance whereby, the City would not levy an admission 
charge anytime during the next rive years"). 
115. See Economic Impacts. supra note 1, at 83-84: James Coates. Vegas' Tip to 
Chicago: Casino is family [un, CHI. TRIB., Apr. 10, 1992, at 1, 10 (hereinafler 
Coates]. 
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dictive nature of gambling,l17 When entering a new market, 
it usually takes three to five years for gambling organiza-
tions to hook1l8 that percentage of the population who will 
become problem economic gamblers119 or compulsive eco-
nomic gamblers120 and then to wait fOT them to gamble 
away much of their pre-existing base assets and credit as-
setsY-I The phenomenon of gambling on credit is exempli-
fied in Illinois where during 1993 the riverboats extended 
credit for legalized gambling at a per annum rate of approx-
imately $100 million,''' but by the end of 1994 the per an-
num rate of credit had almost doubled to $200 million. l23 
In other words, "1 to 5 dollars lost was borrowed from [a] 
casino. "124 Of course, this scenario also exemplifies one of 
the increased costs to the criminal justice system associated 
with casino-style gambling-specifically investigating and 
prosecuting persons who write bad checks to casinos. 125 
Notably, sociologists suggest that the phenomenon of writ-
ing bad checks to the casinos is industry-specific. and these 
116. See, e.g., EconomIC !mpacl5, supra note 1. at 83·84: Coates, supra note lIS. 
at 1. 10. 
117. See, e.g., EconomiC fmpaclS, supra note I, at 83 ·84: Coates, supra note 115. 
all, 10. Occasionally, the real reasons that taxing and maximizing the first five 
year.; are so important will Slip inadvertently into the press. Coates, supra note liS, 
a! 10. See generally Air Sicwcr.;.l Reporu Reveal CllJino Strategy. CHI. SUN·TIMES. 
Aug. 7. 1992, at \4 (a chilling expose). 
118. The legalized gambling organizations indirectly confirm these observations 
when those organizations utilize sophisticated marketing techniques to create a 
~gambling market. ~ See, e.g .• OTB Slow, supra note 74. at A12. 
119. See generally CLOTFELTER & COOK, supra note 9, at 92·94. See supra notes 
36·39 and accompanying text. 
120. See supra notes 36-39 and accompanying text. According 10 sociologists, 
there may be a trend evincing an increase in the ··speed·· with which problem and 
pathological gambler.; develop once a state legalizes gambling. Letter from Dr. 
Rachel Volberg. President, Gemini Research, to Prof. John Kindt, U. Ill. (Dec. 23. 
1m). 
121. See supra note 117 and accompanying text. 
122. Having just begun operating in 1991. the Illinois rh'erboats during 1993 
were already legally extending $115 million in credit. Toby Eckert, RiverboalS Give 
Gamblers $1l5 Million in Cndir in '93, PEOR IA J. STAR, Apr. 17, 1994, at AI. 
123. Gamblers Cash In, Lose Ow 011 Credit: I in 5 Dollars Lolt Was Borrowed 
From CasillO. HERALD & REV. (Decatur, ilL). Mar. 27, 1995, at 1 ("Riverboat gam-
blers in Illinois took out $167.4 million in credit over the last 11 months-nearly one 
dollar in credit for every five dollars lost,"). 
124. Id. 
125. Id. 
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bad checks would not transfer to or occur in other busi-
nesses if the casinos were absent from the economy,l26 pri-
marily because these bad checks are largely a by-product of 
compulsive gambling.127 
In any event, once the 10% "cream market" has been 
largely exhausted, the gambling organization will be 
tempted to leave l28 and may move.129 If the fixed assets 
cannot be moved economically, the gambling organization 
must then increase efforts to appeal to the 42% of the pub-
lic who will tend to gamble recreationallyYo At this point, 
morc advertising and marketing gimmicks are utilized, and 
more tax concessions are often sought.13I In one example 
in Iowa, legislation was designed to allow the Prairie Mead-
ows horse track to remain open "without having a single 
126 See itt. Su aLso CompuLsive Gambling, supra note 33, at 43-45; Henry R. 
Lesieur & Kenneth Puig, IlISuuUlce Problems and Pathological Gamblmg, 3 J. GA/ooI· 
RUNG OF-HAV. 123 (1987). 
127. l l1e issu~ associated with granting credit to compulsive gamblers lire 
problematic. 
Researchers have reported on different rates of indebtedness of patho-
logical gamblers in treatment The mean gambling-re lated debt (excluding 
aUlD loans, mortgages, and other "legitimllle~ debt) of individuals in treat-
ment ranges from 53 thousand dollars to 92 thousand dollars. Female 
Gamblers Anonymous (OA) members have a lower level of gAmbling re-
lated debt, Averaging almost 15 thousand dollars. This is only the debt that 
they acculllulate and does not include the debt they payoff. r"Or an esti-
mated 18 percent of males and 8 percent of females in studies of treatment 
s.amplcs and members of Gamblers Anonymous, this eventually led to 
bankruptcy. 
CompulsIVe Gambling, supra note 33, at 44 (citations omitted). During a twenty-
year period in New Jersey, Mover $514 million dollars was accumulated in debt by 
compulsive gamblers in that state alone per year.~ Compulsive Gambling, supra 
note 33, at 44-45. By comparison, "[p]alhological gamblers cost Maryland lind its 
citizens about $1.5 billion annually in los! work productivity and embcaled, stolen 
or o therwise abused dollars." MARYLANO REPORT, supra note 42, at 2. "The IOlal 
cumulative indebledness of Maryland's pathological gamblers exceeds $4 billion." 
MARYLANO REPORT,supra note 42, at 2. See also Congo Hearing, supra note 2, at 83 
(statemcm of Dr. Valerie Lorenz. Elec. Oir. , Compulsive Gambling Ctr.). 
128. Gambling Blow. supra note 24, al Al. 
129. Id. See aiso William Petroski. Riverboat Casino Firm Didfl 'r "'II/fill 
PromISes, Des Moines Register, May 28,1992, at A2; Fogarty, SreamboOl Move SIU1/S, 
Angers Some Lowmak.ers, DES MOINES RECISTER, May 28. 1992, at A I , A2. 
130. CLOTFELTER & CoOK, supra note 9, at 92-94. 
131. Losing ControL' WI/haUl Assessmefll 0/ Gambling, Expamion Push Persists , 
TELEORAPH HERALD (Dubuque, Iowa), Mar. 22. 1992, at A4 [hereinafter Losing 
Comron 
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horse circle the track."132 This track did not have live horse 
racing for 2 years!33 and also served as a clinical example of 
an establishment which was directly and indirectly "subsi~ 
dized by Polk County [Iowa] taxpayers"'" at a cost of $60 
mi1lion to $100 million.135 The three greyhound tracks were 
experiencing similar financial problems, and one declared 
bankruptcy in 1993. All of the Iowa racetracks pressured 
for various tax concessions and legislative concessions to 
enhance their financial viability.' 36 This scenario paralleled 
the situation in other states, such as Wisconsin137 and Illi-
noisPs In Illinois, one of the 7 horse tracks closed in 1991, 
the same year tbat a riverboat opened nearby. i39 After the 
Arlington International Racetrack burned in 1985, the Illi-
nois pari-mutual tax was reduced in 1987 from 7.75% to 2% 
and off-track betting was authorized.140 However, by 1994 
the racetrack still had to c1ose.141 The I1linois legislature 
was then approached to provide special legislation to main-
tain the financial viability of the track via an elimination of 
132. ld. (although some previous tax concessions would probably be 
eliminated). 
133. Compare IOWA ANN. REP. 1993,supra note 14, at 2, with IOWA ANN. REP. 
1992, supra note 14, at 1. 
134. William Petroski, Prairie Meadows Plan Revised; May Be Rejected By Stafe, 
DES MOINES REGIST1SR. Nov. 3, 1994, at AI. 
135. After refinancing at [ower interest rates a couple years earlier. the 1994 
principal and interest on the bonds for the track was still S62 million and another 
$17.4 million was technically owed to Polk County for expenditures. Id. These fi-
nancial problems were largely ignored in the annual reports of the Iowa Gaming and 
Racing Commission. See generally IOWA ANN. REP. 1993,supra note 14; IOWA ANN. 
REP. 1992, supra note 14. 
136. IOWA ANN. REp. 1993. supra note 14. at 2. 
137. For a detailed analysis of tax and legislative concessions sought by the Wis-
consin racetracks, in particular, see Cary Spivak, Dog Tracks Running inlO Financial 
Problems, MILWAUKEE SE~nNEL, May 26, 1992, at AI, A7. These financial 
problems were largely ignored in the annual reports of the Wisconsin Racing Com-
mission. See gtflerally WIS. GAMINO COMM'N, 1991-92 ANN. REP. (successor organi-
zation as of Oct. I , 1992, consolidating Ihe Wis. Lottery Division. Pari-Mulual 
Racing Division, Off. of Charitable Gaming, and Off. of Indian Gaming). 
138. SU ILL. EcoN. CoMM'N UPDATE 1994, ~upra note 79. at 6-10; ILL. EcoN. 
CoMM'N, supra nOle 67, at 27-46. 
139. Ill.. ECON. CoMM'N, supra note 67, at 45. 
140. 230 ILCS 5n7 (1994)(pari.mutualtax rate reduced from 7,75% 102%. off-
track betting authorized). 
141. Dave Urbanek, LaWmAkers Wary to Buy Racerrack Bailour Plan, NEWS-
GAZETTE (Champaign, III.) , Nov. 18, 1994, al AI. A7, 
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admission taxes combined with a further reduction of the 
pari-mutual tax to .25%,142 However, as State Senator Pe-
tcr Fitzgerald summarized for some of bis colleagues: "It is 
one thing to assist an industry. It is quite another to guar-
antee the private fortune of a single individual."143 These 
scenarios evidence how the taxpayer base is approached 10 
subsidize the financial viability of various legalized gam-
bling activities as over time, the gambling dollars tend lO 
migrate to the more thrilling forms of gambling,l44 Lotter-
ies and racetracks 3fC the first forms of gambling which 
usually face these pressures. However, in the case of New 
York, by the 1990s some off-track betting parlors were al-
ready being subsidized by taxpayer dollars to keep them 
[rom bankruptcy. ]45 
From the perspective of maximizing a state's tax reve-
nues from legalized gambling activities, tax waivers and 
concessions should not be granted; however, such conces-
sions are becoming commonplace. Because new gambling 
establishments often realize windfall profits during the first 
5 years of operations, these years constitute the prime time 
to be taxed from a government perspective. A classic ex-
ample was the largest hotel-casino establishment in the 
United States, the Excalibur, which needed only 2 years to 
payoff its entire mortgage from its operating profitS. ]46 
In another scenario, the investors in the riverboat ca-
sino in Alton, Illinois 
invested $201,000 for their stock. or roughly a penny a 
share. In the offering [of their stock less than 3 years 
after beginning operations], they sold 8.3 percent of 
their shares for $31.7 million. Add in the $13 million of 
dividends they have received, and their investment 
looks pretty good .... 
It did take more than $201,000 to get Argosy [the 
riverboat company] off the ground, and a couple of 
shareholders provided loans to get things going. The 
142. [d . 
143. [d, 
144. See supra note 33 and accompanying ]exr. 
145. See 138 CONG, REC. 5187 (daily ed. Jan. 22, !l:192j(rcprinting article of 
EGon. Prof. Earl Grinols, U. Ill.). 
146. Coates, supra nOle U5. al 10. 
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loans not only bore interest, but, in one case, an addi-
tional and truly extraordinary fee known as an "accom-
modation fee." That fee, for providing a $5 million 
loan, was $8.5 million.'41 
Nothing illegal was alleged in these scenarios, but they illus-
trate tbe point that mega-profits are common during the 
first five years gambling is introduced to unexploited maT-
kets. Legislators have suggested that legalized gambling ac-
tivities in this situation could bear 50% tax rates or more.148 
Therefore, it is not in the best interests of their constituents 
fOT government officials to grant legalized gambling organi-
zations 5-year tax waivers, low tax rales, or other tax 
concessions. 
D. Legalized Gambling Organizations are Often Granted 
Guaranteed Geographic Markets 
No company likes to compete with other companies, 
but with rare exceptions for public policy reasons, all U.S, 
companies must compete in their respective markets. Un-
like other enterprises, legalized gambling organizations 
often have state-sanctioned guaranteed markets because of 
the inherent nature of gambling per se. In their efforts to 
exploit the "cream market" without competing with each 
other, various legalized gambling interests request and re-
ceive guaranteed markets. 149 One common argument 
which these interests utilize when prodding legislators is 
that guaranteed geographic areas would "maximize tax rev-
enues" to the state. l50 Of course, guaranteed geographic ar-
eas in reality maximize the gross amounts being drawn into 
\47. Floyd D. Norris. ftmders Didn 't Takt Much ola Camb/I! With Argosy Gam· 
mg, N.Y. TI :>1I::S, Feb. 25.1993, at D1O. See Coates, supra note 115. at 10. 
148. Maureen O'Donnell, Oberman. floltld Bicker and BUI/le; Ally. Gl'lIl'ral 
HapI'll/is Citl' Kty Issues. CHI. SUN·TIMES, Feb. 24. 1994. at 26 [hereinafter 
O'Donnell]. This article stated that "Obcnnan is cri tical of 'obscene' riverboat gam· 
bling profits. He wants bidding for licenses. with boat owners paid a management 
fee of about 10 percent of gross receipts. Other revenue would go 10 Slale and local 
governments." Id. 
149. Set, t.g., ILL REv. ST"T. ch. 120, para. 2407 (l992). This section was '"too 
specific" in guaranteeing a riverboat gambling license for ElI5t St. Louis and was 
adjudicated as unconstitutiona1. ILL. ECON. COl>U.l"N, supra note 67, at 52. 
ISO. For maps of the guaranteed markets in Il linois for off· track betting parlors 
and gambling riverboats. sec ILL. ECON. COMM'N. supra nOle 67. at 26. 49. 
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the gambling organizations, and due to indirect gains, prob-
ably do proportionately more to enhance their profit mac-
gins than to enhance tax revenues. 
In Illinois, for example, both riverboats and off-track 
belling parlors have indirectly guaranteed geographic mar· 
kets. These geographic markets are guaranteed under the 
1IIioois Riverboat Act'S ! and the Illinois Horse Racing 
Act1:52 which was expanded twice,I53 particularly in 1991,154 
to provide for enough OTBs to exploit systematically most 
practical geographic markets in lllillois. 
It should be pointed out that in granting guaranteed 
geographic markets, government officials are, in one re-
spect, regulating the gambling industry. SerendipilDllsly, 
this is advantageous for taxpayers in that fewer gambling 
establishments decrease the availability and therefore the 
amount of gambling. It is interesting to note that the at-
tempt in Iowa to regulate gambling by enforcing betting 
limits on riverboats (regulation that was not advantageous 
to the legalized gambling organizations) was met with not 
only the removal of two boats, but also a comment from 
one riverboat owner who remarked that he hoped "the de-
parture of the two riverboats sends a message to the Iowa 
Legislature tbat lawmakers must remove Iowa's betting 
limits. "':'>:'> 
III. EVALUATION OF PAST POLICY CONCERNING 
LEGALIZED GAMBLING 
A. Legalized Gambling Crea1es a Ne1 Loss for States 
and the Nation 
While some states and communities realize short-term 
profits from legalized gambling, it is clear that states and 
the nation as a whole suffer a net loss in the long-run when 
all the negative externalities of gambling are considered. 
At the same time, gambling organizations are permitted to 
151. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 120, para. 2407 (1992). 
152. Id. ch. 8, para. 37- 1. 
153. See Id. ch. 120. as amended II!. P.A. 848 (1992). 
154. ld. 
155. Gumbtifl8 Btow, slIpra note 24, at A2. 
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realize windfall profits by exploiting local economies. From 
the strategic economic viewpoint of the state, it is a misdi-
rection to concentrate the attention of government officials 
(and the public) on the numbers touted by legalized gam-
bling organizations. Specifically. legalized gambling inter-
ests historically exploit: 
a. estimates or projections of tax revenues, which are 
often inflated and which often do not materialize l56 
(although projections for pre-existing lotteries and ca-
sino projects can be quite accurate because of track-
records for these two types of legalized gambling); 
156. In general, critics say Hthese jobs and tax-revtllue estimmel are inflattd and 
ignore the long-term social and economic costs ... . - Walsh. supra nOle 49. al A3. 
For example. in the 19 Illinois off'lrack belling parlors (OTBs) the amounts wagered 
went down between 1991 and 1992 (although 8 of the 19 OTBs opcnedjust in 1992). 
OTB Slow. supra note 74, at AI. A12. Of these OTBs opening in 1992. the revenues 
were down by over 50% from those amounts promised by the OTB company. The 
following serve as representative examples of unfulfilled revenue promises. 
Actual Revenues Promised Annual During Approl(. 
Illinois City Tax Revenues 1st 6 Months 
Adams County $100,000 $25.000 (8 mo.) 
Bloomington City $300,000 $33,91 9 
Champaign City $218.000-$225,000 $52.000 
Champaign County $218,000-$225,000 $52.000 
City of QUincy $100,000 $25.000 (8 mo.) 
OTB Slow, supra note 74. at 12. The OTB company promised 100 new jobs in 
Champaign City. but only 50 full- time and part-time employees were hired. OTB 
Slow. Slip ra note 74. at 12. Considering that these five Illinois governmental units 
were warned by expens that the company's projections were grossly inflated and 
since these governments ignored the substantial public outcry against placing the 
OTBs in their jurisdictions. the governmental officials supporting the OTBs appar-
ently proved P. T. Barnum's old maxim that .. [t]here ·s a [governmental] sucker born 
every minute." P. T . Barnum (attributed). as quoled in J. BARTLETT. FAMILIAR 
QUOTATIONS 655 (1 4th cd. 1968). See. e.g., Gambling Is Bad Bllsiness, supra note 
41, at B3 ("15 to 20 different civic, re ligious and other organizations appear[edJ in 
opposition to off-Irack belling" in Champaign. 111.); J , Philip Bloomer, OTB Ap-
proval Down 10 Last Few Inches, NEwS-GAZEJTE (Champaign. 111.). Nov. 10. 1991. 
at A2 ("outspoken gambling opponents" including Rev. Clarence Small. Seventh-
Day Adventist Church, and Mrs. Virginia Nurmi of the Coalition fo r Traditional 
Values); J. Philip Bloomer. Man Persisls in Fighting OTB in Bloomington. NEWS~ 
G .... ZETTE (Champaign, 1Il.), Nov. 10, 1992, at A2 (at least 1,500 to 4,000 petit ion 
signatures against OTB ;n Bloomingron. 11 1.). In one other example. projected local 
tax rel/enues of an off-track betting parlor (OTB) to Quincy, Illinois and Adams 
Counry were touted at 5200.000 per year. During the firs t 8 months of operation, 
the actual local tax revenues were approximately $50,Q(X) per year, which was only 
37% of the tax revenues ··promised " by the OTB. John Webber. OTB Revenues 
Falling Shari of Expectations. QUINCY H ERALD-WHIG (Quincy, Ill.). Jan. 15, 1993. at 
AI. A2. 
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b. the public confusion created by inconsistency in tec-
minology and by the utilization of vague terms in finan-
cial reports which make comparisons difficult;IS7 and 
c. supposed percentages of adjusted gross revenues l 58 
which are mandated to be paid in taxes, such as "20 per-
cenl," which is misleading when compared with the 
mechanisms by which traditional businesses pay 
taxes.1S9 
919 
Setting aside any additional social costs resulting from 
the legalized gambling, one common way for state govern-
ments to begin to assess the real tax dollars actually being 
paid by various legalized gambling organizations consists of 
reviewing the bottom-line tax dollars actually received from 
gambling establishments, and then comparing those reve-
nues to the revenues which would have been paid by non-
gambling businesses having gross sales equivalent to the 
gross win l60 of tbe gambhng establishments. To avoid the 
inefficiencies and anomalies of comparing different catego-
ries of expenses, these numbers tend to reflect a more accu-
rate picture than numbers calculated "after expenses." 
Almost witbout exception, the legalized gambling organiza-
tions are paying at least the proportional equivalent of 
taxes required of non-gambling businesses. Non-gambling 
interests may assert this method does not provide an accu-
rate comparison because some dollars are returned to the 
patrons as "winnings," but the "win," in fact, does not in-
157. See, e.g., Gold, supra note 35, at 28. For example, a "(flail ure 10 distinguish 
between gross and net revenue:· as well as "(n]ot unders tanding relative magni-
tudes." Gold, supra note 35, at 28. 
158. Gold, supra note 35. at 28. See, e.g., ILL. ECOi'oi. COMM'rJ, supra note 67. 
Generally. the 1992 report by the Illinois Economic and Fiscal Commission was suo 
perior to simitar reports, but the differences in tax terminology between the various 
legalized gambling interests makes comparisons difficult. Gold. supra note 35. at 3, 
5,30.31,33,59. Compare, e.g., ILl •. EOON. COMM'N, supra note 67,Ilt 31. 37, wilh 
h..L. ECON. CoMM'N at 55. 59. The legalized gambling interests arc well·known for 
exploiting not only these definitional debates, but also any nebulous terminology. 
See Gambling Laws. supra note 102. at 245. For examples of the far-reaching efforts 
to include all possible sources of pOIential tax revenues. including such items 3S ·'ho-
tel occupancy," real estate transfer laxes, car rentals. el cetera, see PROPOSED 
GAM8LII'Q FACILITY REPORT, supra note I, at 270·71. 
159. See, e.g .. ILL Ecol'o. COMM·N, supra note 67. at 59. 
160. The gross win should not be confused with the ··gross handle" which consti· 
tutes the total amount ·'wagered.~ In casino accounting. the collective losses of the 
players are termed the "win~ or "gross gaming rc\'cnues:' 
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elude the patrons' winnings. Even so. the patrons' winnings 
are typically recycled back to the gambling parlor or its 
cluster services. In 1995, even the President/spokesperson 
for the American Gaming Association, which represents 
most of the U.S. legalized gambling industry, was publicly 
confused and obviously did not understand the basic tax 
structure [or legalized gambling organizations, particularly 
casinos.161 
8. The House Always Wins Eventually 
This principle was enumerated by Economics Professor 
Paul Samuelson, a Nobel Prize Laureate: 
Actually, in all professional gambling arrangements, the 
participants lose out on balance. The leakage comes 
from the fact that the odds are always rigged in favor of 
the "house," so that even an "honest" hOllse will win in 
the long run. l62 
Of course, lost sales taxes and other modifiers further 
widen the gap between the taxes paid by traditional busi-
nesses vis-a-vis legalized gambling organizations. 
Gambling proponents generally present the public with 
unrealistic numbers in regard to payouts as well as taxes. 
For example, the Illinois riverboat statutes reportedly indi-
cate that 80% of the total amounts wagered must " be re-
turned over the game's lifetime to the bettor in the form of 
pay-outs."163 It is important for customers to realize that 
gambling establishments are designed so 90% to 100% of 
payouts will be spent in "cluster services" (i.e., hotels, food 
and services, et cetera) or more likely, continually 
rewagered in other gambling activities until they are even-
tually lost. To help ensure that these gambling dollars are 
161. Transcript of debate between Frank Fahrenkopf, President/CEO, American 
Gaming Ass'n. and Tom Grey, Exec. Dir., Nan Coalilion Against Legalized Gam· 
bling, NET·Political NewsTalk. Network. Tele ... ision, Washington. D.C. (taped Oct. 1, 
1995). 
162. PAUL A. SAMUElSON. ECONOMICS 425 n.6 (lOth ed. 1976) [hereinafter 
SAMUELSON). The present analysis assumes that all legalized gambling operations 
are conducted in an "honest" house. 
163. Losing Proposi/ion. supra note 68, at 1, 5. Several concepts involving the 
practical application of these customs of legalized gambling appear to be nebulous. 
See 230 ILCS 10111 ("Conduct of gambling"). 
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recycled in-house until they are lost, U.S. casinos are tradi-
tionally built without windows or clocks in their gambling 
areas. The maxim that "tbe house always wins eventually" 
constitutes an economic fact since the odds always favor the 
house. l64 Accordingly, relatively low prices are offered in 
cluster services because gambling organizations recognize 
that if they can keep people playing long enough (even over 
a period of years), the casino will eventually, collectively 
approach a 100% capture ratc. l6S 
Furthermore, an 80% payout rate sounds good to the 
public, but this payout is often defined to occur over "the 
lifetime" of the game. l66 Thus, payouts are often "de-
ferred" payments, and theoretically in some scenarios, any 
payouts whatsoever could be deferred forever if the game is 
kept in operation forever. Of course, the games are usually 
designed to have payouts because the marketing aspects of 
g~m~ling require that the customer have the illusion of 
wmnmg. 
There are other mechanisms for reducing payouts. In 
lllinois, for example, riverboats can have non-electronic 
games and apparently "non-electronic games are not regu-
lated, so the operator can take as much as he can get,"167 
according to a member of the lllinois Gaming Board. l68 In 
the proposal for a riverboat in Aurora, Illinois, tbe sponsors 
publicly revealed that the company "will likely gross 14 to 
17 percent of every dollar bet on electronic, and 11 to 12 
percent of every dollar bet on non-electronic games, from 
which operational expenses will be paid."l69 However, fo-
cusing on "every dollar bet" instead of the gross win obfus-
cates the public's perception of the actual profit margin-
particularly since the payouts are almost routinely 
rewagered until the gambling dollars are left with the ca-
sino. In other words, the casinos' potential for enormous 
profits is large, and the numbers of dollars being left in the 
164. See SA\lUELSO:-1, supra nOle 162, at 425 n 6. 
165. See SAMUCLSON, supra note 162, at 425 n.6. 
166. Losing Proposition. supra nOle 68. al AI. 
167. Losing Proposition, supra note 68. at A l. 
168. Losing Proposition, supra note 68. at AI. 
169. LoSing Proposition. supra nole 68, at A I. (emphasis added). 
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legalized gambling organizations are much larger than 
those organizations like to admit publicJyPO 
c. Estimates of Tax Revenues From Gambling are 
Often Inflated 
Perhaps the most controversial aspect of the promises 
for positive tax Hows being disseminated by legalized gam-
bling organizations are that, with the exception of lotteries 
and casinos, the promised tax revenues to be generated 
only infrequently meet projections, l7l Furthermore, once 
the promises of tax revenues have prompted governmental 
acceptance of legalized gambling, the gambling organiza-
tions traditionally ask for and receive further tax conces-
sions. In one example taken from Illinois, the city council 
approved and extended a yearly $1.6 million tax rebate to a 
riverboat after only three years of operation, despite the 
fact that the tax rebate required the mayor to downscale 
projects, put a freeze on hirings/equipment purchases, and 
consider "increasing the revenue from other sources, which 
could mean property tax increases." m Frequently, govern-
ment decision makers ignore warnings by economists that 
these scenarios will develop. These officials become embar-
rassed when the socio-economic negatives begin to manifest 
themselves, and they must then argue for more legalized 
gambling as the only solution - which only delays and then 
intensifies the long-term socia-economic negatives. 
170. For examples or the difficulties in obtaining industry.specific inrormation 
on various legalized gambling activities. ~e supra note II . See also, e.g., Letter from 
Marianne Floriano, Public Information Officer, Ill. Gaming Board, to Prof. John W. 
Kindt, Univ. II I.. July 11 , 1995 (denying request for profits· related information)(copy 
on file with ARK. L. REV.). 
171. See generally Walsh. supra note 49, at 3; OT8 Slow, supra note 74, at AI, 
A12. See. e.g .. sllpra note 156 and accompanying tex!. See supra nOles 115·47 and 
accompanying text. 
172. Rock Island gives lax rebate to !foundering riyerb()(J1 casino, JOURNAL·CoU· 
RIER (Jacksonville. Ill.). June 28. 1995. at I ; Rock Island /0 give casino lax break, 
PEORIA S T AR, June 28, 1995, at AI. 
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D. Over Time Tax Revenues from Legalized Gambling 
Decrease and Social Costs Increase 
Businesses considering locating a subsidiary in one of 
several potential locations traditionally ask for tax conces-
sions and then compare the benefits packages which are put 
together by government officials of the locales under con-
sideration. These requests for concessions are understanda-
ble because new businesses in any given area generally 
contribute new dollars, jobs, and tax revenues to that area. 
In exchange for these economic positives, officials are will-
ing to grant some concessions. 
However, legalized gambling organizations are not 
tradi tional businesses, and they bring negative economic 
impacts to a community which almost always outweigh the 
positive impacts. For example, in an area with a city/county 
population of 275,000, the projected reduced economic ac-
tivity caused by an off-track betting parlor was $4.95 million 
in direct losses plus another $7.4 to $12.4 million in indirect 
losses, and a net loss of 145-250 jobs.173 Given the Large 
socio-economic negatives associated with legalized gam-
bling activities, it is remarkable that government officials 
continue not only to grant tax concessions to the gambling 
interests but also to grant larger and more concessions than 
traditional businesses might expect.174 The situation is al-
most as if the " fun " aspects of gambling mean that legalized 
gambling organizations deserve premium concessions: 175 
Chicago, like other cities strapped for funds, would 
do well to take a long look at the highly touted "fun" 
ways of reinvigorating its economy. 
Casinos bring cultural pollution, heightened regUla-
tory costs, and organized crime. Chicago would do bet-
ter to work for economic renewal the old-fashioned 
way, with tax incentives, budget cuts, a smaller and in-
creasingly privatized bureaucracy, and rigorous police 
and fire protection. Chicago's political culture may not 
173. Grinols Champaign Report. nJpra note 75, at 2. 
174. For examples of direct and indirect tax concessions to legalized gambling 
organizations, see Losing Control, supra note 131. 
175. Thomas F. Roeser. Chicago Casmo Plan Gambles City FUlure, WALL ST. J .• 
Aug. 12. 1992. at AIO. 
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be perfect, but it can surely make sound economic plans 
without betting on the false promise of casino 
gambling. 176 
A fortiori, unless the gambling activities are allowed 
continually to increase in scope, the overall tax revenues 
from legalized gambling organizations going to combined 
local and state tax coffers are constantly decreasing while 
social·welfare costs are dramatically increasing, When 
states and localities notice that tax revenues are decreasing, 
it is because the gambling organization is diverting con-
sumer dollars (and potential tax dollars) away from the 
traditional non-gambling economy, and because the legal-
ized gambling organization could be paying relatively few 
tax,es (or no taxes at all) due to partial or total 5-year tax 
waivers. 
IV. A PROPOSAL FOR FUTURE LEGALIZED 
GAMBLING POLICY 
A. Limit Gambling to State Lotteries 
As of the beginning of the 1990s, only 52% of the U.s. 
public would gamble, according to conservative esti~ 
mates. In Gaining acceptability and momentum during the 
19805,178 the state lotteries had and were continuing to in-
troduce the consuming public to the concept that legalized 
gambling was sociologically acceptable. l79 Theoretically, 
the subtle marketing techniques of the legalized gambling 
interests and of the state lotteries, in particular, could even-
tually persuade 100% of the public to gamble, but as of the 
early 1990s only 52% of the public would engage in legal-
ized gambling, which generally meant gambling via the 
176. ld. 
177. Ci.OTFELTER & CooK, supra note 9, at 92·94. 
178. Ct.oTFELTER & CooK, supra note 9, at 145·46. See generally Gambling's 
Fall, supra nme 82. 
179. BETTER Gov'T ASS'N REPORT, supra note 10, at 2; Gambling's Fall, supra 
note 82. 
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state lotteries. ISO From every dollar spent on the state lot-
tery, a state netted approximately 40 cents. lSI 
However, in other forms of legalized gambling, the 
bets per se are generally DOt taxed; only the "adjusted gross 
revenues" are taxed. In the case of Illinois riverboats, for 
example, the tax dollars being paid (and confirmed by 
riverboats' own estimates)l82 are 15% to the state and 5% 
to the local government unit}S3 Thus, from a state revenue 
viewpoint , state governments should only permit legalized 
gambling via state lotteries-if there is any legalized garn~ 
bling at all-because for every dollar spent on the lottery 
the state receives 40 cents, but in the other common forms 
of legalized gambling the state only receives approximately 
15 cents. For every dollar moving from the state lottery to 
another form of legalized gambling, the state loses 25 cents. 
This is equal to a 170% loss in tax dollars to the state. 
Therefore, from a fiscal perspective of maximizing tax dol-
lars to the state coffers,184 it is deleterious to legalize gam-
bling activities beyond the state lottery. It is important to 
note that a state receives 100% of the profit from a lottery, 
but only 15% of the "win" from riverboat gambling. Thus, 
in TlIinois it has been proposed that all of the profit of the 
riverboats, not just a small percentage, should be paid to 
the state and then a 10% management fee should be paid 
by the state to companies to operate the riverboats .18s Fur-
thermore, as those legalized gambling organizations 
"cream" their guaranteed geographic markets, they are cre-
ating, exacerbating, compounding, and accelerating the so-
cial-welfare costs in those geographic areas , as well as 
statewide. Therefore, under the taxing policy practiced in 
most states with legalized gambling. each state actually in-
ISO. See generally CLOT .... ELTI;R & COOK, supra note 9, al 26-27. For an analys is 
of "deceitful" loltery advertising as "lhe only form of ad\'ertising unburdened by 
slale and federal trUlh- in-ad\·ertising standards," set! Joshua W. Shenk:, Evuyolle's a 
Loser; /Jow Lonery Ads Emia th t! Wrong People to Gambie, WASH. MONTH LY, 
July-Aug. 1995, at 22. 
181. D..oTFELTER & CooK, supra nOle 9. at 26-27. 
182. Losmg Proposition, supra note 68. at AI. 
183. Losing Proposition , supra note 68. al AI. 
184. See Gambling Rt!venue Bad. supra nOle 1, at 18. 
185. O'Donnell. supra note 148, at 26. 
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creases and accelerates the social·welfare costs which the 
state coffers will have to address. At the same time, the 
state is not maximizing. and is in fact decreasing, the reve-
nues which would otherwise be collected. 
B. If Legalized Gambling is Permitted, Minimize its 
Negative Impact 
To address the negative impacts on the business-eco-
nomic environment, as well as to prevent the development 
of the socio-economic ills associated with legalized gam-
bling, state and federal legislation should be directed to-
ward the following goals:186 
1. a complete ban on all advertising of gambling activi-
ties, as permitted under the 1986 U.S. Supreme Court 
case Posadas de Puerto Rico Associates v. Tourism Co. 
of Puerro Rico; l87 
2. a complete ban on collecting gambling debts l88 and 
the criminaiization of any attempts to collect gambling 
debts;Hl9 
3. a complete ban on the utilization of credit by gam-
blers and the criminalization of any direct or indirect 
extensions of credit for gambling purposes;l90 
4. the aUlOmatic revocation of legalized gambling 
licenses and alcohol licenses for those ~ambling parlors 
allowing persons under 21 to gamble ,l9 predicated only 
on the fact that such gambling occurred-with "intent" 
by the parlors being irrelevant; and 
186. See g~~rally JOHNSTON, supra note IS. 
187. 478 U.S. 328 (1986). 
188. Collections of gambling debts arc generally already difficult. With regard 
to a legalized gambling organization in one state trying to collect a gambling debt 
o ..... ed by the citizen of another state, in 1986 "only the courts of New York and New 
Jersey have found gambling is nor repugnant to the public policy of their states and 
have allowed foreign casinos Ii. e., casinos in other states] to use their court systems 
to coUect.'· 1. Nelson Rose. The Impact of American Laws On Foreign Legal Gam-
bling. 8 N.Y.L. Sell. J. INT'L & Cm.1P. L. 129, 154 (1986). However, by 1994 increas-
ing numbers of states had eased or were fl irting with easing the restrictions on 
collecting gambling debts. 
189. See generally JOHNSTON. supra note 15. 
190. See generally JOHNSTON, supra note 15. Su supra notes 122-27 and accom· 
panying text. See also Boars Loantd Gamblus $1l5 Million Lust Year, NEWS-GA. 
Z(TTE (Champaign, Ill.), Apr. 18, 1994, at AS. 
191. See generally JOHNSTON, supra note 15. 
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5. a prohibition against free alcoholic drinks in gam-
bling parlors.l92 
927 
With regard to this last recommendation, gambling 
parlors, particularly casinos, generally keep free alcoholic 
drinks flowing to those persons who might be considered 
compulsive gamblers or problem economic gamblers. 
Computers are used to keep track of this market segment, 
and unlike any other area of business, the members of this 
market segment often receive anything necessary to keep 
them gambling-free hotel rooms, free meals, free en-
tertainment, large credit lines, and even free airline tickets 
and limousine service to the casinosyn In one welJ-known 
instance, the former owner of the Philadelphia Eagles, 
Leonard Tose, "was given extensive lines of credit, free 
rooms, meals, entertainment, and limousine service, "194 and 
"he lost $14.6 million at the Sands Hotel Casino between 
June 1981 and April 1986,"'" which forced him to sell the 
Eagles in 1985. 196 When the casino filed suit in 1991 to re-
cover $1.3 million in gambling debts from him, Tose 
counter-sued, seeking punitive damages and contending 
that "the casino plied him with free drinks and forced him 
to gamble while drunk."I9? 
Pleas by friends accompanying Tose to shut down 
gaming tables when he became intoxicated were ig-
nored, said [a witness] Philadelphia Common Pleas 
Court Senior Judge I. Raymond Kremer, a longtime 
acquaintance. 
".They would. keep fill~~ his glass," Kremer told 
the nme-member JUry .... 
According to court papers, psychiatrist Dr. Richard Saul in-
dicated that "Tose suffers from major depression, patholog-
ical gambling and alcohol abuse"l99 and that he "does not 
192. SU genually JOHNSTON, supra nme 15. 
193. See generally JOHNSTON, supra nme 15. 
194. Ex-Eagles Owner Suing 10 Recover Gambling Losses, D AILY HERALD (Ar-
lington Heights, 111.), Feb. 15, 1993, § 3, at 4 [hereinafter Gambling Losses]_ 
195. [d. 
196. Jd. 
197. Jd. 
198. Wife: Casino Encouraged Tose To Gamble, D AILY H ERALD (Arlington 
Heights, 111.) , Feb. 19. 1993, § 3, at 2. 
199. Gambling Losses, supra nOle 194, at4. 
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have the mental ability to manage his funds at a gaming 
table."2°O 
The court did not award Tose his losses based on a fac-
tual detemination of Tose's aUeged intoxication, however, 
the Tose case established an interesting precedent "that any 
and all losses incurred while the plaintiff [Tose] was allowed 
to gamble while drunk ... [would] be considered proxi-
mately caused by defendant's negligence, as a matter of 
law."201 In a similar case in 1989, "a federal jury rejected a 
lawsuit from a New York City gambler who contended the 
Golden Nugget [casino] plied him with alcohol and pain 
killers, causing him to lose $165,000."202 Without legalized 
gambling activities, these types of cases would generally be 
non-existent, but as legalized gambling proliferates whole 
new legal areas will be developed to accommodate the new 
issues. 
A case involving a minor being allowed to gamble 
highlights another legal issue and an area of concern. In 
Erickson v. Desert Palace, Inc.,203 19-year-old Kirk Erick-
son sought recovery of $1,061,812 he had won in Caesar's 
Palace Casino in Las Vegas.204 Although the facts indicated 
the casino knew he was a minor while he was gambling and 
even served him alcoholic drinks , the casino refused to pay 
because Kirk Erickson was under 21, the legal gambling age 
in Nevada.20S On appeal to the U.S. Supreme Court, a writ 
of certiorari was denied; in other words, Erickson lost his 
case,206 and casinos are now theoretically in a "win-win" 
scenario. If casinos allow minors to gamble and the minors 
lose, the casinos win, and if the minors think they win, the 
casinos still win because they do not have to pay winnings 
to minors. This scenario seems bizarre, but perhaps it reaf-
200. Comb/illS Losses, supra note 194. at 4. 
201. Tose v. Oreal Bay Hotel and Casino, Inc., 819 F. Supp. 1312,1323 (D.N.J. 
1993), citing GNOC Corp. v. Aboud, 715 F. Supp. 644 (D.N.J. 1989), aff'd 34 F.3d 
1227 (3d Cir. 1994). See also David A. Kaplan. Know When to lIold 'Em, Know 
When to Fold 'Em, NEW'SWEEK. Mar. 15, 1993. at 68. 
202. Gambling /...ossu, supra note 194, at 4. 
203. 942 F.2d 694 (9th Or. 1991), ttn. denitd. 112 S. Ct. 1476 (1992). 
204. Id. 
205. &e id. III 695· 96. 
206. /d. 
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firms the oldest gambling rule-"the house always wins 
eventually." Furthermore, "Nevada casinos know that in 
the ... [approximately) 60 years that gambling has been 
legal, no casino has ever been fined for allowing minors to 
gamble. "201 
C. Impose a Fifty Percent Tax Rate on All Legalized 
Gambling Establishments 
The starting point for negotiating the tax rate on all 
gambling parlors should be SO%-with no direct or indirect 
tax waivers or concessions. Even this level of taxation will 
not address all of the socia-economic ills created by gam-
bling interests, but it will begin to "internalize the externali-
ties." If state legislatures cannot be dissuaded from 
attempting to raise tax revenues by legalizing gambling ac-
tivities, those legislatures should cease negotiating with the 
gambling organizations and tax them at 50%. For example, 
in 1993 the idea of a 50% tax on video lottery profits gained 
momentum among South Dakota's legislators.2os 
Highly-positive demographics for the profitability of 
the proposed casino complex in Chicago suggested that the 
State of Illinois could demand taxes of 30-50% and the 
complex would still be highly profitable.2ot) Also, in January 
of 1993, several state legislators in South Dakota called for 
50% tax rates on various form s of legalized gambling, and 
serious suggestions were made to increase the tax on the 
casinos in Colorado up to "40 percent."210 Within one year 
of these Colorado casinos opening, the Gaming Control 
207. I. Nelson Rose, The RISe And Fall Of The ThIrd Walle: Gambling Will Be 
Ollllawed In Forty Years 6·7 (published in Gambling and Public Policy: Iflferna· 
tional PerspeClives, Ins!. for Study of Gambling & Com. Gaming, U. Nev. 1991). 
208. See e.g., Chef Brokaw, Don't Bet Yel On Stote Lot/ery Take Fate, AR.GUS 
LEADER (Sioux Falls, S.D.), Jan . 5, 1993, at 61 (32-33% of South Dakota legislators 
want more taxes all video lottery profilli, 22·23% against, 42·44% undecided): Terry 
Wosler. Pierson 10 Sponsor Schoo/·Aid BIll. ARGUS LEADER (Sioux Falls. S.D.) . Jan. 
9,1993, at Bl (Oem. 51. Sen. Dennis Pierson sponsors bill 10 raise state tax to 51% 
on video-lottery profits); Roger Larsen. Volesky: CUI Gaming Pie If! New Way, THE 
PLAINSMAN (Huron, S.D.), Nov. 8, 1992, at 1,5 (Rep.-elect Ron VoJesky proposes 
state tax of 50% on lIideo lottery profits). 
209. Marj Charlier. The Payoff: Casmo Gambling Salles Three ColorrJdo Towns 
But the Price Is HIgh. WAll. ST. J ., Sept. 23,1992. at A6. 
210. Id. 
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Commission increased the stale gaming tax from 15 to 20%. 
It also imposed various other taxes including a 50% in-
crease in "device fees " (from $150 up to $200) on slot ma-
chines and table games.211 In naming this latter tax, 
Colorado unwittingly, but perhaps aptly, named it "de-vice 
tax. " 
V. CONCLUSION 
The mass media recognizes the fact that "gambling is 
now almost everywhere, and has achieved a terrible hold on 
a people raised to think that lunch can be free. "212 Tn order 
to address the large socia-economic costs caused by legal-
ized gambling, corporate, personal, and real estate taxes 
must increase. Taxable entities in society mllst somehow 
pay for the increased crime, the administrative and moni-
toring costs, and the social-welfare costs,213 As business-ec-
onomics experts commonly expound: "There is no such 
thing as a free lunch,"214 In any event, more empirical evi-
211. I. Nelson Rose, Gambling And The Law: 1992 Elections Endless Fields of 
Dreams 1:3 (1992)(unpublished article ava ilable from Law Prof. I. Nelson Rose, 
Whittie r Law School). 
212. Cree" Eggy & Ham, W"l..l.. ST. J., Apr. 27. 1m, al A14. See generaUy 
L"itK't' BitAIDFOOT, G " MBl..INO: A DEADLY G"ME (1985). See auo Cathy M. 
Johnson & Kenneth J. Meier, nle Wages Of Sill: Taxing America'y Legal Vicey, W. 
POL. Q., Oel. 1989, at 578. 
21:3. For discussions involving the social impacts of gambling activities, see E. 
DEVEREUX, GAMiJl..ING AND nil: SOCIAL STRUCTU!{E (1980): H. Roy Kaplan, The 
Social and Economic Impacf ofSfQle LollentY. 474 ANN"I..S AM. ACAD. POL & Soc. 
Sa. 91 (1984); Lettich, The S<Jcwllmpacl of Carjno C(Jm.bling on Allamic Cily, L 
ENrORCEMENT INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS DIG .. Summer 1988. 
214. See, e.g., Mich. All')' Gen. Frank Kelley, Address before the Inn Confer-
ence on Gambling, Nashville, l enn., Feb. II. 1994. at 2; Business-Econ. Prof. Walter 
Primeaux, U. Ill., Address to the Exec. MBA Graduation Dinner, Champaign, !!I., 
May 21,1988. For discussions of the issues involving public finance , see RICHARD 
A. MUSGR"VE & PEGGY B. MUSGRA~, PuBLIC FINANCE [N THEORY AND PR AC 
nCb (1980): HARVEY S. ROSEN, PUBLIC F[NANCE (2d ed. 1988). For ovcrviews of 
the impacts of stale lotteries, see SeN. CoMM. GOV'T AFF., SUHCOMM. INTEROOV'T 
AfT-.. 98m CoNG. 2D SES~., ST"TE LOTIERIES: AN OVERVIEW (1985); COMM. 
Gov'T AFF., SUBCOMM. 1",-n;;Roov'T A~T., OVERVIEW OF STATE Lol'I"llR't' OPERA_ 
TIONS (Cong. Res, Serv., Sept. 25, 1984). See also Charles T . Oot(elter & Phill ip J. 
Cook, Implicit Taxation in LOfrery Finance, 4() N"T'L TAX J. 533 (1981): Larry De-
Boer, Lottery Taxes May Be Too High. 4 J. POl..·Y ANALYSIS & MANAGEMENT 594 
(1986): Francois Vaillancourt & Julie Grignon, Q:madimt Loueries ar 1iues: Reve-
nues and InCIdence, 36 Can. Tax 1. 369 (1988); Jon David Vasche, Are Taxes on LOI-
Imes Too High? , 4 J. POl..'Y ANALYSIS & MANAGEMENT 269 (1985): Walker, 
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dence in these issue areas is needed, and a moratorium on 
expanded legalized gambling activities should be imposed 
while this taxation and economic evidence is forthcoming. 
Even with the misdirection which is traditionally prac-
ticed by legalized gambling interests, naivete on the part of 
government officials should not be excused. However, gov-
ernment officials are not the only ones who have displayed 
naivete. The 52% of the public that engage in legalized 
gambling are also naive to think they can win with the odds 
at millions to one against them.21S This public naivete is at 
least partially excusable when the trust which the popula-
tion has in its government is abused. For example, when 
the state of Illinois advertises the state lottery as an invest-
ment for a child's dollars, as an alternative to investing in 
education, or when the state blatantly lies to its citizens by 
advertising that the odds are with the gambler,116 it is sadly 
apparent that a public office is no longer a public rrust.l17 It 
is indeed tragic when the gambling philosophies which are 
false are so widely accepted. 
Lorreries for Public Revenu~-A Med~val Throwback, AMERICAN CrTY, Oct. 1934. 
at 57. See generally George A. Hacker, Taxing Booze for Health and Wealth, 6 J. 
POL'Y ANALYSlS & MANAGE.\IE",-r 701 (1987). 
215. Michael P. Gilvary & Jane H. Leuthold. Why Play the //Iinors Lottery? ILL. 
Bus. REV .. OcL 1989. at 10, 12. 
216. Nancy Millman, A Lillie Lotto means a lor in hard·sell ad campaign. CHI. 
TRIB .. Aug. 2. 1992. § 7. at 1. 2. 
217. See generally Alfred N. King, Public Gaming and Public Trust, 12 CONN. L. 
REV. 740 (1980). 
